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Abstract 
The threat of anthropogenic climate change is arguably the defining issue of the 21st Century. 
Climate change has devastating global implications to which various authorities worldwide have 
responded by declaring a climate crisis. Australia, however, has neglected to address this issue. 
The Liberal-National Coalition, which has almost exclusively held government since John Howard 
was elected Prime Minister in 1996, maintains its scepticism on anthropogenic climate change 
despite international scientific consensus. It established Australia as a climate laggard, a reputation 
which was suspended for a brief period of Australian Labor Party (ALP) Government from 
2007-2013. Despite the promise of a progressive government, attempts at climate change 
mitigation by the ALP were also criticised for their weak targets and generous financial 
concessions that primarily benefitted the nation’s biggest polluters. The inconsistencies between 
the actions and rhetoric of the ALP, which under Rudd proclaimed climate change as the ‘greatest 
moral challenge of our generation’ have raised the question of whether there were other actors 
infiltrating this government. This paper examines the role of key political actors in shaping Labor 
Government climate policy. Specifically, it investigates the undue influence of vested interests, 
understood as interest groups which conflate their self-interest with that of the nation. It finds the 
mining industry is the most powerful opponent of climate policy. Australian Government climate 
policy has typically addressed the symptoms of climate change rather than the root of the problem. 
The mining industry has taken advantage of this tendency, utilising the ALP’s ecological 
modernisation policymaking framework to minimise the impact of emissions-reduction policy on its 
bottom-line. The undue influence of powerful interest groups has resulted in a climate policy that 
supports the growth of the carbon-economy, favours business-as-usual and fails to address the 
damaging corporate practices of emissions-intensive industries.  
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Abbreviations  
 1
ACTU 
AIGN 
ALP  
AMWU 
ARENA 
AWU 
AYCC 
CEFC 
CFMEU 
CPRS 
EM  
ENGO 
ER 
ERT 
ETS 
LEAN 
LNP  
NFP 
SD 
TWU
Australian Council of Trade Unions  
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network  
Australian Labor Party  
Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union  
Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
Australian Workers’ Union 
Australian Youth Climate Coalition  
Clean Energy Finance Corporation  
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union  
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
Ecological Modernisation  
Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation  
Economic Rationalism  
Emissions Reduction Target  
Emissions Trading Scheme  
Labor Environment Action Network  
Liberal-National Party  
Non-For-Profit 
Sustainable Development 
Transport Workers’ Union
 The CFMEU merged with the Maritime Union of Australia and the Textile, Clothing and Footwear 1
Union of Australia in March of 2018. It is now known as the Construction, Forestry, Mining, 
Maritime and Energy Union (CFMMEU)(Wright 2018). 
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1. Introduction  
A. Introduction  
The threat of anthropogenic climate change is arguably the greatest long-term challenge to the 
future prosperity of Australia. This global wicked problem has already had grand social, economic 
and security implications such that various authorities worldwide have declared a climate crisis.  2
Despite the acute vulnerability of the unique Australian landscape and biodiversity to the adverse 
effects of climate change (Commonwealth 2009), the nation’s response has not been of the same 
caliber as its neighbours.  It was reprimanded by host-island Tuvalu and other regional allies at the 3
Pacific Islands Forum of August 2019 for its poor commitment to combatting climate change. 
Forum leaders agreed that no amount of adaptation funding for the region can compensate for 
Australia’s failure to cut emissions (Lyons 2019).  This criticism, however, has fallen on deaf ears - 4
specifically those of current Coalition Prime Minister Scott Morrison who once brandished a lump of 
black coal in Parliamentary Question Time to slander the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Opposition 
for apparently inciting coal-o-phobia in the electorate (Murphy 2017).   5
The climate policy decisions of the Australian Government today will determine the nation’s future 
emissions trajectory for the next fifty years. Current federal climate policy has placed Australia on a 
course of inaction. Amidst a climate change debate dominated by coalition and industry fuelled 
scepticism since the Howard Government in 1996, the brief period of progressive Australian Labor 
Government from 2007-2013 remains the most stringent in the recent history of federal climate 
politics. The Australian Labor Government defined climate change as the ‘greatest moral challenge 
 Climate change is a wicked problem because it does not have one definition or a simple solution. 2
It is a scientific, environmental, human, political, economic and religious problem (O’Brien 2017). 
 The Great Barrier Reef has suffered coral bleaching and erosion due to its acidification and the 3
increase in ocean carbon (GBRF 2019). Rural Australia is plagued by the worst super drought in 
more than a century (Marinelli 2019), resulting in the loss of produce, livestock and livelihoods for 
farming communities.
 Liberal-National Coalition Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, pledged $500 million over 5 years in 4
climate resilience and adaptation funding for the Pacific at the Pacific Islands Forum (Lyons 2019). 
 Then Treasurer of the LNP Coalition, Scott Morrison toted a lump of coal in parliament in 2017, 5
celebrating it as the future to the nation’s energy and reprimanding the Opposition’s coal-o-phobia 
(Murphy 2017).
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of our generation’ (Rudd 2007) and implemented a price-based emissions-trading scheme which 
effectively facilitated the largest recorded drop in emissions in over a decade (Gillard 2014:392). 
However, it also suffered criticisms based on policy insufficiency.  
This study aims to understand the influence of political actors in Labor Government climate policy. 
It identifies the interest groups that occupy the political arena on climate change and the various 
tactics they use to exert influence. It argues the mining industry is a powerful vested interest 
capable of manipulating the Labor Government’s ecological modernisation (EM) policymaking 
framework to suit its emissions-intensive objectives. A mixed methods approach using elite 
interviews and Australian Labor Party National Platforms is used to deduce the influence of interest 
groups. This study finds that the undue influence of vested interests must be neutralised if political 
parties are to engage in real and just action against climate change.  6
The remainder of this introduction reconstructs a timeline of Australian Labor Government between 
2007 and 2013. Then it discusses the climate election in 2007 where the decisive issue of climate 
change was used by the ALP as a political tool to win government. It also discusses the more 
recent climate election in 2019 which failed to deliver the same electoral success for the ALP. 
Finally, it touches on the role of coal in Australia’s emissions-intensive economy and the barriers in 
the way of a sustainable energy transition. Chapter 2 discusses the existing academic literature on 
the state of the climate change debate which has become a culture war of values, culture and 
ideology in Australia. The literature review also discusses current understandings of interest groups 
and energy system transformation. Chapter 3 explains the mixed methods research design using 
data from elite interviews and ALP National Platforms. Chapter 4 states the quantitative results 
from the ALP National Platforms, followed by a semantic analysis of the environmental content. 
Chapter 5 states the qualitative results from the elite interviews, followed by an inductive analysis 
of the patterns which emerge from the data. Finally, Chapter 6 provides an analysis and discussion 
of both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
 The justice lens is an important framework for the Australian Labor Party, discussed in Chapter 4. 6
The ALP’s understanding of climate change as ‘the greatest moral challenge’ is exemplary of this. 
As a social democratic party, the ALP aims to promote social justice. 
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B. Timeline  
The Labor Opposition led by Kevin Rudd defeated the Howard Coalition Government in 2007 after 
eleven years of Liberal-National (LNP) leadership. The issue of climate change had been a major 
topic of debate that differentiated the ecologically progressive ALP from its ‘out-of-touch’ opponent 
and ultimately contributed to its landslide victory (Gascoigne 2008). Under the ALP Government, 
climate change was to be addressed as ‘the great moral challenge of our generation’ (Rudd 2007), 
however, climate change action during the following two terms under Rudd, Gillard and Rudd again 
did not generate the policy change promise of this claim. The Rudd Government in 2010 chose to 
shelve its central emissions quantity regulation incentive, the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(CPRS), rather than call a double dissolution election following the scheme’s repeated rejection in 
the conservative-dominated Senate. The Clean Energy Act (2011) introduced by the Gillard 
Government was first reframed by the LNP as a ‘carbon tax’ and later legislatively repealed by the 
LNP when Tony Abbott took office in 2013.  
Within a six year period, two internal leadership challenges took place and not one of the ALP 
climate change mitigation policies stuck. The succeeding LNP Government repealed the Clean 
Energy Act, abolished the Climate Commission and defunded the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation (CEFC)(Talberg, Hui and Loynes 2016). ,  Rather than ‘forge a national consensus on 7 8
climate change’ (Rudd 2007), the Labor Government from 2007-2013 earned a reputation for 
policy failure on climate change mitigation. Attempts at explaining ALP failure have suggested its 
policies were symbolic, not practical, (Crowley 2012; Ferguson 2009; Gascoigne 2008; Macintosh 
2008; Taylor 2014), driven by economic imperialism rather than science and social welfare 
(Macintosh 2008; Pearse, R. 2016 and 2018; Rickards et al. 2014), and dominated by the influence 
of vested interests (Allern and Bale 2012; Christoff 2013; Garnaut 2008; Macintosh et al. 2010; 
Pearse, G. 2009; Tangney 2019).  
 The Climate Commission (2011-2013) was designed to provide independent expert advice and 7
information on climate change to the public (Talburg et al. 2016). 
 The Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) was a $10 billion fund dedicated to clean energy 8
investment established in 2012. The Coalition Treasurer ordered the CEFC to cease investments 
in 2013 (Talburg et al. 2016). 
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C. Climate Change Election  
Ahead of the 2019 federal election, political forecasts predicted its outcome would depend on the 
climate change policy platforms of the major parties. News media outlets observed that 
environmental debate dominated over traditional issues such as border security and the cost of 
living (Bedo 2019). The election campaign shaped the 2019 federal election into a ‘climate election’ 
in response to the series of natural disasters which took place the previous year, including fires, 
floods and the worst super drought in over a century (Whiteman 2019). This is not the first instance 
when climate change featured as a central election issue. Climate change was previously labeled 
‘the decisive issue’ in 2007 (Gascoigne 2008; Rootes 2008). Gascoigne (2008) and Rootes (2008) 
examine the extent to which the issue of climate change defined the 2007 federal election. Both 
agree it had a significant impact on the election outcome, and further demonstrate how the issue 
was used as a political tool. Rootes highlights a clear break made from the climate politics of the 
Howard Government, which Gascoigne also argues was used as a proxy to exploit the policy 
discomfort of the Coalition. To an extent, climate change was a means for the ALP to differentiate 
itself (Gascoigne 2008:523). In 2019, the rigorous climate policy platform on which the ALP staged 
its campaign did not deliver electoral success. As a result, the concern with climate change as the 
‘leading threat to Australia’s vital interests’ held by 64% of Australians has since gone unaddressed 
(Lowy Institute 2019; Kassam 2019; Murphy 2019).  
D. The Role of Coal  
Although no economic or technological barriers exist in the way of a sustainable energy transition 
(Slezak 2017), the legacy of coal as our natural competitive advantage, ‘key to Australia’s future’, 
still persists (Pearse, G. 2009:26). Approximately 85% of the domestic energy supply is sourced 
from fossil-fuels and coal is the nation’s single largest export (DEE 2019). These statistics showing 
the nations’ coal-dependence featured in mining industry rhetoric which argued that a sustainable 
energy transition would result in the systemic failure of the energy market (Pearse, R. 2016a:325). 
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The mining industry has typically stood in opposition to ALP Government mitigation policy, 
successfully lobbying for exemptions and compensation to safeguard against mine closures and 
job losses expected to ‘unravel the national electricity market’ (Pearse, R. 2016a:325). Its crisis 
rhetoric exaggerates the role that the mining industry plays in the Australian economy, which 
employs only 2% of the labour force and contributes less than 10% to the national gross domestic 
product (ABS 2019a; ABS 2019b; Pearse, G. 2009:12).  
Opponents of rigorous climate policy often cite the apparent insignificant Australian contribution to 
global greenhouse gas levels as a justification for weak action (Pearse, G. 2009:78; MacDonald 
2019). The strength of the Labor Government’s emissions reduction target (ERT) under the CPRS 
was contingent on ‘global agreement where all major economies commit to substantially restrain 
emissions and all developed countries take on comparable reductions to that of Australia’ (DEE 
2019). The ERT was set at 15% below 2000 levels if this condition was met, or 5% otherwise. 
Australia is responsible for less than 2% of global emissions (Talberg 2013). This figure does not 
include emissions produced by the nation’s coal-exports or take into account that the Australian 
population constitutes only 0.3% of the global total (McDonald 2019). This means Australia is the 
highest per capita carbon-emitter of all OECD countries in the developed world and amongst the 
highest worldwide (Garnaut 2008:53). Therefore, the misperception that Australia’s less-than-2% 
contribution to global emissions is small or insignificant does not excuse the government from its 
international emissions-reduction obligations. Global agreement and comparable reduction targets 
should not qualify as necessary conditions against weak emissions-reduction targets in Australia.  
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2. Literature  
A. Climate Change Culture War  
Within Australia, the issue of climate change is the subject of a culture war. The climate change 
culture war is a contest of values, culture and ideology between the neoliberal right-wing and 
environmentalist movements (Ferguson 2009; Taylor 2014). Despite international scientific 
consensus, social understandings of climate change are divided along political ideological lines. 
Australian political parties perceive climate change using competing worldviews constructed 
historically through language, party ideology and partisanship.  
This political climate change culture war is relatively new. Prior to the 1990s, a strictly scientific 
approach was promoted in bipartisan politics and by the news media (Taylor 2014:xiii). Then 
dominantly referred to as the greenhouse effect, it appeared as though Australia might even lead 
the way internationally in climate change mitigation policy, with a 20% emissions reduction target 
on 1988 levels by 2005 established under Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke (xii). Taylor (2014) 
documents how the fossil-fuel industry used political framing and the media to subvert the scientific 
discourse to suit its economic interests.  According to her, this is the origin of the climate change 9
culture war. She summarises the political history of the climate change debate over the past 20 
years as ‘a tale of power, profit and eventual willingness to accept social and economic change, 
falling back on traditional beliefs and values through language’ (171).  
While the fossil-fuel industry is largely to blame for the current state of the climate change debate, 
the LNP has played a significant role in fuelling the climate change culture war - and many others. 
The Howard Coalition Government constructed numerous culture wars throughout its eleven-year 
term on various issues ranging from Aboriginal self-determination to the non-nuclear family 
(Ferguson 2009:289,291). Prime Minister John Howard was known to cite his ‘gut feeling’ on the 
integrity of climate science which he believed was being used as a ‘substitute for religion’, 
(Ferguson 2009:296; Howard 2013). Howard’s intuition and the LNP’s anti-environmentalism were 
 Please note the subtitle of the book, ‘Global Warming and Climate Change: What Australia knew 9
and buried… Then framed a new reality for the public’, by Maria Taylor (2014).
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backed by industry-sponsored studies undertaken by veteran ‘experts’ once involved in discrediting 
the scientific findings on tobacco and asbestos (Pearse, G. 2009:35). Liberal-National Coalition 
climate policy was governed by three pillars; inaction on mitigation and adaption, voluntary 
beneficiary-pays programs and the protection of emissions-intensive industries (Macintosh 
2008:51). The anti-environmentalist ideology born under the Howard Government still persists two 
decades later. More than half of the LNP members continue to deny accepted scientific reality 
(Patrick 2017).  The climate change culture war is a weapon in the political arsenal of the LNP. It 10
has become a standard feature of the political environment in Australia and defines the adversarial 
nature of climate mitigation policymaking. 
The tendency for right-wing politicians to approach climate change with scepticism and denial can 
be understood as a feature of a conservative worldview. Jost et al. (2003) in Fielding et al. (2012) 
offer System Justification Theory as an explanation for this phenomena. This psychological theory 
argues that conservative ideologies are resistant to change and support the existing order (714). 
The existing order privileged by the Liberal Party is based on a neoclassical orthodoxy that values 
the immutable economic tropes of individual rationality and consumer sovereignty (Lewis 2018). 
According to this logic, climate change is incompatible with the LNP’s conservative ideology as it 
demands systemic change and disrupts the existing socio-economic order. The carbon-economy, 
based in agriculture, fossil-fuel power generation and energy-intensive manufacturing in Australia, 
was of primary concern to the Howard Coalition Government from 1996-2007 (Macintosh 2008:56). 
Industry stakeholders found their political and financial interests were at risk from environmentalist 
demands for immediate action to reduce emissions and combat this urgent, wicked problem. 
Conflict between the need to mitigate climate change and simultaneously satisfy industry 
stakeholders led the Coalition to adopt a sceptical, and even denialist, approach to climate change. 
This acted to preserve the LNP’s conservative worldview and further frame international calls-to-
action such as the Stern Review (2006) as ‘Eurocentric propaganda’, (Howard in Macintosh 
2008:66).   11
 An informal estimate by the Executive Director of the Institute of Public Affairs, John Roskam, 10
claimed that more than half of Liberal Members of Parliament are solid sceptics of climate science 
(Patrick 2017). 
 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006) is a report by Economist 11
Nicholas Stern commissioned by the Government of the United Kingdom.  
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The climate change culture war is a function of ideology. It is driven by spin which manipulates 
internationally-accepted scientific truths to fit the reigning narrative of energy politics in Australia 
lead by the Liberal-National Coalition, Minerals Council of Australia and mining and energy lobbies. 
The narrative in question celebrates the mine and ‘King Coal’ as key to future energy prosperity 
(Pearse, G. 2009:28), and in so doing, creates immense social uncertainty on climate activist 
movements and the virtue of emissions reduction. Ferguson (2009) theorises that this uncertainty 
is cultivated by the ‘Australian New Right’ using the culture war tropes of anti-elitism, political 
correctness and an Australian/un-Australian binary (131). Within Australia, the ‘New Right’ refers to 
the Liberal-National Party and is embodied in its economically liberal and socially conservative 
politics. The LNP under the Howard Government was largely responsible for the anti-
environmentalist culture war; discursively, it employed a ‘deficit model’ discourse based on the 
belief that no amount of scientific evidence can ever be conclusive on what climate change means 
for Australia (Tangney 2019:131). Ferguson argues, based on his discourse analysis’ findings, that 
political framing acts to discredit the environmental movement in order to legitimise socially and 
ecologically destructive corporate practices (2009:289).  
Stegmann and Ossewaarde (2018), who also use discourse analysis, theorise that ‘historical blocs’ 
use the myth of sustainable development to reinforce existing power relationships. They argue that 
hegemonic discourse coalitions of government, non-government and corporate actors employ the 
green growth paradigm to suit the interests of their stakeholders. Based on reorienting economics 
to resolve social and environmental challenges, this paradigm benefits the coal-dominated energy 
sector in Australia by decoupling growth from environmental degradation (2018:25,26). Ultimately, 
green growth is still growth, and nowhere does this discourse acknowledge that fossil-fuel industry 
expansion is not compatible with environmental protection or sustainability. Either example of 
discursive framing demonstrates the pervasiveness of political spin in the climate change debate. 
The threat of climate science and advocacy to the energy politics narrative in Australia has aroused 
a hostile discursive response from those whose interests are threatened.  
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Ecological modernisation argues the economy would benefit from a move to environmentalism. 
Like green growth, it seeks to make capitalism sustainable (Curran 2009:203). The EM paradigm is 
discussed by Christoff (2000) in relation to the extent its weak application favours economic gain, 
on one side of the spectrum, or contrarily, the environment as the polar-opposite strong alternative. 
Weak EM measures are narrow, national, hegemonic, instrumental and technocratic or closed 
(Christoff 2000:222). This ‘weakness’ refers to the ability of EM measures to deliver lasting 
ecologically sustainable transformations. Strong measures, in contrast, are primarily systemic. 
These approaches are problematic because they fail to address underlying systemic problems. 
They fail to address the damaging corporate practices which cause anthropogenic climate change. 
Weak EM and green growth deliver incremental change that has little to no effect on the economy. 
It allows the business-as-usual responsible for environmental degradation to persist. Therefore, 
climate policy dictated by weak EM and green growth has only a superficial ecological reach. 
The climate change culture war has typically been documented as a discursive tool used by the 
centre-right LNP against its ‘climate-friendly’ Opposition (Macintosh, Wilkinson and Denniss 
2010:200). This coincides with the trend of polarisation on the importance of climate change action 
which has consistently split Labor and the Greens in favour and the Liberals/Nationals against 
(Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western and Hoegh-Guldberg 2012:712). Survey data collected by 
Fielding et al. (2012) concludes that partisanship and party ideology are determinant factors of 
politicians’ beliefs on climate change. The study of state and federal members of parliament and 
local government authorities finds that political party leaders strive for policy distinctiveness, 
resulting in a left/right partisan split on action against climate change. This policy distinctiveness 
was evident during the ALP opposition campaign ahead of the 2007 federal election wherein leader 
Kevin Rudd used climate change to differentiate from the ‘out of touch, old, complacent, and still 
embroiled in yesterday’s issues’ Prime Minister, John Howard (Gascoigne 2009:523; Tranter 2011).  
The political elite are not alone in their polarisation. Tranter (2011) observes that the electorate 
echoes the political views of its party leaders, indicating that partisanship is a strong predictor of 
public concern on climate change. He argues that cues provided by party leaders have a 
‘simplifying function’ for the public to make sense of complex political issues (2011:81,92). Tranter 
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operationalises existing data from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes and the Australian 
Election Study to uncover individual determinants, such as gender, education and social class, that 
coincide with climate change attitudes (2011:80). Tranter suggests that climate change is subject to 
routinisation, meaning it becomes normalised within politics and addressed in a habitual manner - 
in this case via a polarised partisan split (2011:80). Consequently, the adversarial drama between 
neoliberal right and socially progressive left has been institutionalised in the place of scientifically 
technocratic bipartisan attempts at mitigation policymaking. 
While the climate change culture war is predominately documented as occurring along party lines, 
an alternative body of literature disputes this partisan split. It questions the integrity of the ALP’s 
commitment to combatting climate change, claiming that ecocentric efforts at mitigation have been 
discarded in favour of bipartisan market-oriented reform (McDonald 2013; Miller and Orchard 2014; 
Pearse, R. 2016a). This perspective is critical of neoliberal action on climate change and its 
discursive variations, such as green growth, green economy and ecological modernisation.  12
Whilst neoliberal approaches are the historical standard, it argues that both price and quantity 
emissions-regulations have been means to greenwash business-as-usual and have entrenched 
the nation’s coal dependence. Capitalist solutions to the climate crisis have attempted to 
depoliticise environmental policymaking using the economic reductionist logic of least cost 
opportunities (Bryant 2016:878) and thus downplay the activism of environmental movements. In a 
critical approach to the political economy of coal governance, R. Pearse (2016a) argues that 
governments develop climate policy in a manner that serves to protect energy-intensive activities. 
She draws attention to the limitations of neoliberal climate policy: it treats the symptoms but 
overlooks the disease such that mitigation policy fails to address the underlying contradictions of 
energy markets and sustainability in Australia. Simply put, an emissions-intensive market-based 
economy does not, and cannot, coincide with the objectives of environmental preservation.  
Attempts by the Rudd Government in 2008 and the Gillard Government in 2011 to implement 
emissions trading and carbon pricing resulted in failure. Both schemes were based on weak 
national emissions reduction targets, further offset by billions of dollars in subsidies to emissions-
 These concepts are discussed on pages 12, 13 and 29. 12
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intensive industries. ,  Both supported emissions-intensive accumulation and both were 13 14
eventually shelved or repealed. The apparent inadequacy of ALP climate change policy 
demonstrates that, despite the discursive contest and corresponding trend of partisanship on 
climate change, this ‘progressive’ party is not as climate-friendly as it appears. Further studies on 
the failure of so-called ‘progressive’ climate politics by McDonald (2013) and Miller and Orchard 
(2014) reach normative conclusions: progressives must address unsustainable consumption and 
move beyond short term considerations of economic growth if the Australian Government is to 
engage in meaningful climate policy.  
The climate change culture war in Australia is characterised by loaded rhetoric featuring values 
and ideology in the place of scientific consensus. Policy that has eventuated from this debate has 
failed to undermine the coal hegemony; rather, it has supported emissions-intensive accumulation 
through neoliberal instruments such as market nonintervention, reductionist approaches to 
externalities and a myopic view of the future (Rickards, Wiseman and Kashima 2014:758). Despite 
the documented party-specific, partisan and ideologically driven polarisation on climate change, 
the respective climate policies of the progressive left ALP and neoliberal right LNP both prioritise 
the emissions-intensive economy. Although parties strive for policy distinctiveness, market-based 
mitigation remains the institutionalised standard. Regardless of party alignment, political leaders 
have retreated from genuine climate change action such that even the ‘climate-friendly’ ALP has 
facilitated the interests of emissions-intensive industries through its feeble climate policy. Anti-
environmentalist rhetoric and market-based policies by both major parties have rendered vested 
interests the ultimate beneficiaries of climate policy in Australia. Rather than protect against 
dangerous climate change, policies rooted in the discursive political culture war and bipartisan 
neoliberalism act to stimulate the carbon economy.  
 An emissions trading scheme (ETS) is a market-based approach to reducing greenhouse 13
gasses by capping emissions and creating tradable pollution permits (Sandbag 2011). 
 A carbon price, or carbon tax, is a market-based approach to reducing greenhouse gasses by 14
setting a direct price on carbon-emissions (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition 2019). 
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B. Interest Groups  
Cooperation between interest groups and political parties is intrinsic to the contemporary Australian 
political party system. Groups must foster cooperation if they are to achieve their policy objectives. 
As policymaking power is concentrated amongst ministers and senior civil servants, the executive 
branch of government is typically the primary target of interest group influence. Interest groups use 
a combination of insider and outsider mechanisms to influence those with decision-making power 
(Halpin and Fraussen 2018).  
An interest group is understood as a collective membership organisation which seeks to influence 
public policy (Halpin 2015:103). Without direct policy-setting capacity, groups must instead 
influence politicians, political parties and the electorate by means of insider politics to achieve their 
objectives (103). Discussing the relationship of interest groups to political parties in the Australian 
political system, Halpin (2015) asks, ‘are they still in the shadows?’ He is responding to the 
Shadow Thesis initially proposed by Matthews and Warhurst (1993) which contends that interest 
group involvement in politics is contingent on strong parties. The adversarial nature of party politics 
shapes the access, opportunities and strategies employed by interest groups, therefore they 
‘operate in the shadows’ (Matthews and Warhurst 1993:82). Halpin’s Alternative Thesis disputes 
the relevance of this view in a contemporary cartelised political system where adversarial 
programmatic contest is no longer the norm. He finds that the professionalisation of political parties 
has reduced their ideological distinctiveness, thereby reducing the importance of group affiliations 
(2015:109). Managerial effectiveness rather than group solidarity is central to the electoral race. 
This argument echoes that of Allern and Bale (2012), who note that the deterioration of formal 
relations does not preclude these autonomous organisations from instead cultivating informal ties. 
The short answer to Halpin’s question regarding the nature of interest group and political party 
relations - ‘are they still in the shadows?’ - is insider politics. Halpin and Fraussen (2017) study 
internal processes with the aim of understanding the role of interest groups in public policy agenda 
setting. They find that informal relations are the groundwork for collaborative governance, noting 
how economic interests are realised through the maintenance of personable relations over time 
rather than the deployment of campaign-style techniques (2017:18). Further findings by Rickards 
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et al. conclude that groups act as ‘trusted advisors’ whilst reinforcing their self-serving responses 
(2014:756). They note, in a study of senior decision makers in politics, that groups shape the policy 
platform by expressing their concerns using the dominant discourse of the party in question (766). 
Therefore, interest groups are able to exercise autonomy in their approach to shaping public policy, 
and in doing so, hold influence over policymaking.  
The discourse on vested interests relates to interest groups. ‘Vested interests’ is a floating term 
with no fixed meaning often used to denote actors who stand to benefit from the maintenance of 
the status-quo, especially those with financial stakes in certain outcomes. This term emerges 
throughout various disciplines but is rarely explicitly defined. The working definition used by former 
ALP Treasurer and Deputy Leader, Wayne Swan, is the most relevant to this study. Writing about 
the concentration of wealth amongst the 0.01%, Swan warns of the threat to social democracy 
posed by so-called ‘vested interests’. He reflects on the objectives of big business and industry, 
referring to groups that characteristically misrepresent their self-interest as that of the nation (Swan 
2012).  
Within the climate change discourse, vested interests are addressed by various scholars including 
Macintosh, G. Pearse, R. Pearse, Rickards, and Taylor. In her book on how public understandings 
of climate change in Australia transformed from informed consensus to confusion in the 1990s, 
Taylor (2014) observes that fossil-fuel industries have penetrated climate politics. G. Pearse 
(2009), writing about the belief that the nation’s greatest asset is its mineral resources, goes one 
step further to identify specific vested interests affiliated with the ALP: amongst those implicated 
are the Australian Workers’ Union (AWU), the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU), 
the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU), the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union (CFMEU), the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) and the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU). Trade unionism and emissions-intensiveness are shared characteristics of 
the interest groups identified, however, they are not the only features of so-called vested interests. 
G. Pearse points to these actors to expose the ‘shadowy world of carbon lobbyists’ (2009:blurb) 
and is not alone in his suspicion of their intentions. The Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008), 
which outlined recommendations for the Rudd Government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, 
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also warned of the undue influence of vested interests, specifically on the design of the emissions 
trading scheme and its resulting poor policy outcomes. These scholars collectively warn against 
vested interests which conflate their self-interest with that of the nation.  
The two-party tradition of the Australian political party system has facilitated close ideological 
affiliation between interest groups and political parties on either side of the left-right split (Halpin 
2015:107). For the ALP, cooperation with trade unions is characteristic of its institutional structure, 
having itself originated from a workers movement. Its affiliated trade unions, which are also 
typically factionally aligned, are drivers of internal politics within the party (Economou 2015:13). 
Economou (2015) examines the consolidation of modern factionalism within the ALP to determine 
whether it is democratic, oligarchic or polyarchic in structure. He finds it is a study of polyarchy, 
citing as evidence the existence of many centres of power controlled by ‘faceless men’ who exert 
influence from behind the scenes. Economou argues that contemporary factionalism is motivated 
by power rather than ideology thereby resulting in cartel politics. ,  Historically recurring divisions 15 16
over ideology, structure and policy demonstrate the difficulty of appeasing interests within the 
party.  These interests, while diverse and contentious, must appear united at election time if it 17
hopes to ‘catch-all’ of the electorate. As a result, factionalism within the ALP tends toward 
cartelisation due to the increasing depoliticisation of the party, its resistance to internal reform and 
the concentration of government resources with powerful factions (Economou 2015:5; Reece 
2015). 
Party-group relations are often discussed with regard to the trend of union membership decline and 
a subsequent distancing of union groups from the party (Economou 2012). Contrarily, G. Pearse 
 The term ‘faceless men’ was coined by journalist Alan Reid, referring to the ALP Federal 15
Executive which decides the platform for government. The term describes individuals who exert 
political influence but are not elected representatives and therefore have no political accountability 
(Cassin 2002). 
 Cartelisation Theory argues that parties pursue the same policy agenda, therefore competition is 16
governed by managerial effectiveness (Halpin 2015:109). The cartel party does not campaign for a 
distinct political agenda or rely on groups for funding as it has access to the resources of the state 
(2015:109). Its internal factions are pragmatic. They are interested in power rather than ideology 
(Economou 2015:5).
 The ALP split over ideology in 1916, 1931 and 1955. Most notably, the 1955 division consigned 17
the ALP to Opposition for nearly two decades (Economou 2012:4). 
 !18
(2009) documents their closeness in a critique of Australia’s ‘Quarry Vision’. The mining industry 
and its unions pursued close relationships with parties with the aim of infiltrating the government. 
The view that the minerals industry is key to future national prosperity, he finds, has allowed for 
concessions to be made in favour of this vested interest. These range from subsidies to complete 
policy penetration, one example being the doubling of financial assistance for coal mines to the 
value of $1.5 billion under the CPRS (Combet in Pearse 2016:325). The challenge for the ALP to 
satisfy such a diverse range of legitimate interests - subunits and its electoral base - and backroom 
pressures from vested interests has made climate change policymaking insurmountably complex. 
Interest groups seek to exert influence using two distinct approaches: insider or outsider pressure. 
While insider approaches occur behind closed doors between actors with longstanding relations, 
outsider approaches are not constrained by access to the political party and are waged publicly 
(Halpin and Fraussen 2017:388). Scientific consensus on dangerous climate change has made it 
risky for vested interests to campaign publicly against its mitigation. Outsider politics has the 
potential to tarnish the reputation of business, industry and union groups, therefore these public 
techniques are on the decline. Groups are at no risk, however, in pursuing their interests through 
obscured and informal ties. Behind closed doors, insider politics has a powerful impact. Halpin and 
Fraussen (2018) discuss the means by which interest groups influence political parties, using the 
2016 Federal Election as a case study. The four key insider mechanisms they highlight are 
financial dependencies, organisational overlap, ideational affinity and common membership (382). 
These methods of insider politics are only viable for groups with established party-group relations.  
Alternative mechanisms of outsider politics take advantage of public opinion to mobilise political 
parties in their interests. The ‘Mining Tax Ad War of 2010’ demonstrates the power of harnessing 
public outrage through the media. McKnight and Hobbes (2013) pick apart this advertising 
campaign by the Minerals Council of Australia. It was a publicly-waged campaign against a policy 
to tax mining companies’ ‘super profits' achieved during an unprecedented export-driven mining 
boom in 2010. The MCA’s advocacy advertising contributed to the removal of a first-term Labor 
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Prime Minister and re-shaped the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (2013:307).  Advocacy advertising 18
is a scare tactic used to gain public traction and, in the case of the Minerals Resource Rent Tax, 
effectively curbed a taxation policy at odds with the interests of the emissions-intensive industry. 
Lobbying is another means of group influence, predominately used to fulfil rent-seeking objectives. 
Interest groups attempt to manipulate governments and public policy for their own economic gain. 
Expressly, groups seek to gain payment above the cost involved known as ‘economic rent’ (Brown, 
McLean and McMillan 2018). R. Pearse (2016b) evaluates the ability of emissions trading schemes 
to limit coal production and consumption, finding it a weak instrument unable to address real-world 
failures of coal governance. She explains that emissions-intensive industries’ rent-seeking lobbying 
has institutionalised favourable compensation arrangements at the cost of the taxpayer (325). 
Efforts by the carbon lobby have historically exerted disproportionate political influence in Australia 
(Pearse, G. 2009:31).  
The issue of climate change has mobilised numerous groups acting in their particular self-interests. 
Emissions-intensive industries represented by trade unions and lobbies bear the most influence. 
They employ techniques of insider and outsider politics as appropriate during the electoral term 
and have proved capable of manipulating climate change policy to their financial gain. The capacity 
of interest groups to influence public policy via political parties has increased with party 
cartelisation such that party-group relations no longer occur in a dynamic of strong parties and 
groups in the shadows. This does not mean that party-group relations are an observable 
phenomenon. They are obscured ‘behind closed doors’, especially in the case of vested interests 
which conflate their self-interest with that of the nation. Their undue influence has led to poor policy 
outcomes and the subsequent failure of progressive politics geared toward climate change 
mitigation policy, as demonstrated by the ALP CPRS. While factions, trade unions, interest groups 
and lobbyists are all legitimate actors involved with political parties in government, the private 
nature of their interactions conceals the dynamics of climate change policymaking and its barriers. 
 The Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) was a weak version of the Resource Super Profits Tax 18
(RSPT). While the RSPT was levied at 40% on extractive industries, the MRRT was levied at 30% 
on only the ‘super profits’ of iron ore.  It replaced the RSPT in 2012  (Swan 2014:334). 
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C. Energy System Transformation 
Any climate change policy implemented in Australia today will determine the nation’s long-term 
future emissions trajectory. The nation’s energy supply is driven by coal-fired power stations which 
has resulted in a nationwide fossil-fuel dependence. The carbon economy is highly polluting. To 
mitigate the effects of greenhouse gas emissions, future energy and climate policy must be 
coordinated against the threat of dangerous climate change. 
Both Labor Government emissions-reduction policies used market mechanisms as disincentives to 
curb investment in fossil-fuel energy production and encourage industry to seek fossil-fuel-free 
alternative generation solutions. The CPRS (2008) under Rudd and Clean Energy Act (2011) under 
Gillard were to function as financial motivators for investment in renewable alternatives. Thereby, 
investment into coal-fired power plants, which would lock-in emissions-intensive energy production 
for the next five decades due to sunk-costs, would be reduced (Cheung and Davies 2017:97). 
Discussing how fossil-fuel dependency impacts on the prospect of energy system transformation, 
Cheung and Davies (2017) find that economic-transformative 'underachievement' can be attributed 
to the lack of a variety of factors; the lack of bipartisanship, strong political leadership, target-driven 
policies and political motivation are identified as barriers to the technologically and economically 
possible energy system transition.  
An energy system transformation for Australia qualifies as the lowest-cost abatement strategy if 
conducted in conjunction with the replacement of ageing and retired coal-fired plants (Cheung and 
Davies 2017:98). Thereby, there would be no lost sunk-costs, and hence, no barriers to the uptake 
of renewables in the transition to a clean energy economy. Of the 24 currently operating coal-fired 
power generators in Australia today, eighteen will inevitably have been decommissioned by 2050. 
Fourteen of these plants will reach the 40-year design-life threshold within the next decade and will 
thus have the potential to retire (APH 2016:6).  Despite Australia’s existing coal-fired power 19
stations nearing their end, the Australian Government’s plan for the future looks starkly different. 
 Coal-fired power generators have a design life of 40-50 years (Quong 2019). 19
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Climate and energy policies by the Australian Government to date have been described as a ‘form 
of madness’ by Hudson (2019).  Hudson acknowledges the efforts of the main coalminers union, 20
the CFMMEU, for having consistently tried to slow the growth of renewable energy (2019:588). 
Despite the coal-hegemony, a renewable energy economy is a real alternative to fossil-fuel power. 
The nation has an abundance of economically and technologically viable renewable resources 
(Geoscience Australia and BREE 2014 in Cheung and Davies 2017:99). Falk and Settle (2011) 
discuss energy policy frameworks suggested under the Labor Government, focusing on nuclear, 
Carbon Capture and Storage and climate change scenarios. They describe the climate policy 
environment as an ‘energy crossroads’ and conclude that a non-nuclear, low-emissions future 
independent of coal is within reach (2011:6804). Although possible, Falk and Settle predict that this 
transformation remains unlikely. The Australian Government is under immense pressure from 
interests groups, and shares in the mining industry’s interest to continue to profit from coal through 
taxation, royalties and exports. The Australian Government often argues that it can have both its 
coal profits and emissions-reduction through Carbon Capture and Storage, despite this technology 
still being far from commercially available (2011:6804,6811).  
The Australian Government on both sides of the left-right divide repeatedly tried to gentrify 
emissions-intensive energy production by framing it through an ecological modernisation (EM) 
discourse. Curran (2012) defines EM as ‘a theory that promises a market system which is both 
sustainable and dynamic, both green and productive’ (202). He argues that coal economies like 
that of Australia employ EM as a win-win solution to the threat of dangerous climate change. 
Herein, weak reforms have supported the existing coal hegemony by shielding the economy from 
necessary ecological restructuring. Only in Australia, Curran argues, have a suite of mitigation 
policies been designed to complement the coal economy and thereby defend the energy status-
quo (205).  
 Hudson (2019) echoes former Coalition Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, who, in his resignation 20
speech in 2018, said that the actions of his fellow LNP party members towards climate change 
were a ‘form of madness’. 
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Despite the need for and feasibility of an energy system transformation, Australian Governments 
continue to support the coal hegemony at the detriment of nascent renewable energy alternatives. 
The first coal-mining basin (the Galilee Basin in Queensland) to have opened in 50 years recently 
passed its approval requirements and was celebrated by the Morrison Coalition Government as a 
‘great win’ for jobs (Ireland 2019). The Queensland State Labor Government vowed to fast-track 
further proposals for the Adani-Carmichael Coal Mine and Federal Labor resources spokesperson 
Joel Fitzgibbon stated that the ALP ‘welcomed the decision and jobs’ (Ireland 2019). The 
‘progressive, climate-friendly’ ALP’s enthusiasm over the 45,000-hectare mine is counterintuitive in 
the age of dangerous climate change, where coal is already the single largest source of 
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide (Muenstermann 2012:233; Greenpeace 2019). Employment 
is cited as a major concern for both major parties in a renewable energy transition, however, 
statistical modelling of prospects in each industry tells a starkly different story. Adani is forecasted 
to provide 1500 direct and 6750 indirect jobs (Ireland 2019), whereas the shift to renewables could 
create as many as 60,000 new jobs by 2030 (The Australia Institute 2018). Such modelling 
disputes employment as a justification for pursuing the high-carbon coal-fired power option and 
begs the question of where government interests truly lie.  
In the event the Australian Government were to facilitate the transition to a low carbon economy, 
this shift would occur gradually due to the nation’s coal-dependence. Even before Adani, Australia 
was over-invested in coal both economically, in the sense that coal-fired generators could quickly 
become stranded assets, and politically, with regard to the influence of mining interests (Cheung 
and Davies 2017:104). Historically within the ALP, mining interests have been pursued in the 
parliamentary ranks by the factional representatives of the Australian Workers Union (AWU), 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (recently CFMMEU with the addition of Maritime), 
and the Australian Mining Workers Union (AMWU)(Pearse, G. 2009:6). As representatives of the 
fossil-fuel economy, industry and trade union groups have been beneficiaries of taxpayer-funded 
government subsidies to the total of $10 billion annually (Riedy 2007).  Under the Rudd Labor 21
Government, this equated to $15 in fossil-fuel subsidies for every one dollar spent on climate 
 Total energy an transport subsidies in Australia during the period 2005-2006 was estimated 21
between $9.3 billion and $10.1 billion according to a report by Riedy (2007) with the Institute for 
Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney. 
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change mitigation (Pearse, G 2009:62). This has functioned to obscure inefficiencies and 
reproduce market failures at the expense of the renewables sector; by decreasing the costs and 
increasing the productivity of fossil-fuel production, subsidies have incentivised emissions-intensive 
industries to increase their quotas and emissions whilst renewable energy is stripped of its 
competitive advantage (Riedy and Diesendorf 2007:126; Curran 2009:214). This is what Riedy and 
Diesendorf (2007) call the ‘distorting effect’ of subsidies. They examine financial subsidies to fossil-
fuel production and consumption in Australia, describing a ‘perverse situation’ where taxpayers 
ultimately fund fossil-fuel industry pollution, as well as the cost of cleaning up this pollution (135).  
Union groups are not alone in their ability to exert influence over the Australian Government. The 
remarkable capacity of the coal-mining sector to translate economic into political power is 
addressed by Baer (2016:199), recounting the period spanning from Federation to the Gillard 
Labor Government. He describes the late-stage nexus between the government and the coal-
mining industry under neoliberalism as dominated by the self-proclaimed ‘Greenhouse Mafia’. The 
‘Mob’ consists of the Australian Coal Association (ACA), Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), 
Business Council of Australia (BCA), Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) and its 
associated businesses and corporations (198). This mining conglomerate has been effective in 
‘highjacking’ climate policy through the disproportionate power of its union lobbying effort (Pearse, 
G. 2009:38) and remains infamous for its commitment to defeating the environmental movement 
‘with almost religious zeal’ (Miller 2006).  
Within Australia, politics remains the ultimate barrier to energy system transformation as a means 
to mitigate against the carbon-emissions responsible for dangerous climate change. Rather than 
support the rise of economically and technologically competitive renewable energy industries, the 
Australian Government reproduces the fossil-fuel dominated status-quo. It granted unreasonable 
financial concessions to polluting industries in the face of ALP emissions-reduction policy between 
2007-2013 and recently removed the barriers to the Adani-Carmichael Mining Basin in mid-2019. 
Therefore, the feasibility of energy system transformation away from emissions-intensive energy 
remains unlikely for Australia in the near future.  
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3. Research Design  
A mixed methods research design is used to deduce the key influences on Labor Government 
climate policy.  The combination of qualitative and quantitative data has the benefit of constituting 22
a broader perspective than either data set alone and thus compensates for potential weaknesses 
of the other method. This study examines Labor Government climate policymaking from 
2007-2013. The qualitative component examines four elite-actor interviews. Former political actors 
involved in climate change policymaking were asked about their personal experiences working with 
other self-interested political actors. Their responses are triangulated with a quantitative, semantic 
content analysis. This is drawn from publicly available ALP National Platforms with a focus on 
chapters concerning the environment. The elite interviews provide insider knowledge of obscured 
political actors operating on the Labor Government, which is validated by the National Platforms, 
and vice versa. The influence of key political actors on Labor Government climate policy is not 
evident through simple observation as interactions between interest groups and political parties 
occur behind closed doors. Therefore, a combination of semantic deduction and interrogation is the 
best means to answer the research question.  
Elite Interviews 
The purpose of elite interviews is to provide a window into the private and obscured interactions of 
government. This qualitative method is the best means to discern the influence of political actors 
on ALP climate change policy due to its ability to extract insider information from privileged 
individuals. It is central to the research design. Interview data is rarely used alone due to the 
contextual specificity of the data collected which is tainted by memory, perspective and incomplete 
 The ALP was chosen as the focus of this research study as one of the two major political parties 22
in Australia that has consistently held office. It was selected over the LNP due to the plethora of 
existing literature about influences on the Liberal-National Coalition, such as Macintosh (2008). 
The condition of government, resulting in the focal period of Labor Government from 2007 to 2013, 
was chosen due to the assumption that interests groups pay closer attention to and exert greater 
influence on the party in government than that in Opposition due to its ability to implement policy. 
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knowledge (W. P. Vogt, E. R. Vogt, Gardner and Haeffele 2014:25). Therefore, the elite interview 
data is complemented by a nonreactive content analysis.   23
Political actors from the Labor Government were approached to participate in semi-structured 
interviews regarding the key influences on ALP climate policy. The prospective sample of interview 
candidates included former members of the Australian Labor Party, board members for the unions 
representing emissions-intensive and trade exposed industries, representatives for environmental 
non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), lobbyists and climate experts. This sample was based 
on the condition of former involvement in climate policymaking during Labor Government. A total of 
four from the fifteen approached agreed to be interviewed. Most candidates did not respond to the 
invitation or offered their published memoir as an alternative to participation. The interview data 
was analysed qualitatively for its explicit features, with special attention given to the respondents’ 
career histories and the content of their responses.  
Four ALP Members of Parliament agreed to be interviewed: former Treasurer and Deputy Leader, 
Wayne Swan; Member for Hunter, Joel Fitzgibbon; former Minister for the Environment, Peter 
Garrett; and former Minister for Climate Change, Greg Combet. The interview questions and 
transcripts can be found in the appendix. The contentious nature of this debate may have made 
some prospective participants reluctant to be interviewed. Therefore, offers to review memoirs 
were taken seriously. Unlike interviews, autobiographies cannot be interrogated or asked questions 
relating directly to the research study. Nonetheless, they are complementary to the interview 
research as both data sources provide a window into inner workings of government as experienced 
by the candidates central to this study. The autobiographies were analysed similarly to the 
interviews for their explicit content alongside the authors’ career histories. 
ALP National Platforms 
A comparative content analysis of ALP National Platforms constitutes the quantitative component 
of the research design. The 44th, 45th, 46th and 47th National Platforms resulted from the National 
 Non-reactive content is data contained in written documents or other communication media that 23
was created without the intention or knowledge that it would be analysed (Vogt et al. 2014:49).
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Conferences which took place in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014 respectively. Each contains an 
environmental chapter. When viewed sequentially, these environmental chapters document the 
changes in Labor Party environmental priorities from 2007-2014. These four editions, which mark 
the years preceding, during and following Labor Government, were used under the assumption 
that interest groups devote greater attention to and put more pressure on the ALP whilst in 
executive power. A greater concentration of interest group influence can therefore be expected.  
The quantitative content analysis occurred in three stages. Firstly, a semantic analysis of the 
National Platform environmental chapters was conducted. Its clauses were categorised by issue 
under environmentalism, sustainable development, ecological modernisation, economic 
rationalism, justice, or climate science. An implicit rather than surface content analysis is warranted 
due to the informal nature of contemporary relations between interest groups and cartelised parties 
(Halpin 2015:105). Actors’ interests are largely pursued behind closed doors, and consequently, 
are obscured at all stages of the policy cycle. By 'reading between the lines’ using latent coding 
(Neuman 2014:375), the ALP’s understandings of and internal biases on climate change are 
revealed. Secondly, identical clauses across all platforms were removed from the analysis, leaving 
only altered and new clauses. These new clauses represent the changes in the National Platforms. 
Identical clauses across the platforms were also used as a constant variable to ensure that the 
standard of coding remained consistent. Thirdly, a manifest coding of the residual clauses 
(Neuman 2014:374) was conducted to determine emerging party priorities. These priorities 
revealed key influences on Labor Government climate policy and informed the interview questions. 
The quantitative portion of the mixed methods research design established context and ensured 
that appropriate questions were asked in the interviews.  
The coding categories (Figure 1) arose during the process of data collection and latent coding. 
These categories are not an established academic spectrum of climate discourse approaches. 
Rather they are each based in a variety of sources and have been employed as a spectrum for the 
purpose of this research study as emergent themes in the data. Environmentalism, sustainable 
development, ecological modernisation, economic reductionism, justice and climate science are 
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used to describe the discursive style of each clause.  While this range of categories is not an 24
exhaustive list of ecology-related discourses, it is exhaustive of the emergent categories in the 
National Platforms and is therefore sufficient to thoroughly address the climate change chapters. 
Furthermore, they are not mutually exclusive as more than one category can apply to a clause. 
However, it was necessary to select the single best fit for each clause for the purpose of later data 
analysis.  
Each category correlates with a discourse coalition, referring to a group of political actors who 
share ways of thinking about an issue (Hajer 1995:70). These political actors are not explicitly 
apparent in the ALP National Platforms. Rather, they are deduced from the discourse coalitions 
which are associated with the discursive categories identified within the text. The extent to which 
key political actors influenced Labor Government climate policy is determined by the concentration 
of each discursive category. This inductive method has been effectively used in various studies on 
the politics of climate change (Christoff 2013; Audet 2012). Analysing national climate change 
policy debates from 1988 to 2013, Christoff (2013) establishes a climate discourse complex 
consisting of scientific, ethical, economic, technological, politico-legal, and daily-life discursive 
fields. He finds that the economic discursive field dominates the climate discourse complex in 
Australia. A similar approach is used by Audet (2012) to identify conflict, transition and vulnerability 
as discourses used by bargaining coalitions at the Conference of Parties in 2016. Both Christoff 
and Audet conduct studies that inductively identify discourses in nonreactive content, thus 
demonstrating the value and validity of this approach. Their specific categories are not applicable 
to this research study as the semantic content analysis of the National Platforms is used to induce 
the presence of actors within each discourse coalition, hence specific, emergent categories are 
required.  
 The ALP ‘environmental priorities’ are listed as numbered clauses in the National Platforms.  24
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Latent Coding Categories 
Environmentalism: 
Environmentalism denotes concern about and protection of the environment. It refers to symbiosis 
of human beings with nature and, therefore, political activity in this framework appears apolitical 
and conservationist (Krieger 2014).  
Sustainable Development:  
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs as well (WCED 1987:43). This 
long-term approach favours economic growth within the bounds of ecology and manifests in 
renewables, sustainability and intergenerational justice in the National Platforms.  
Ecological Modernisation: 
The ecological modernisation discourse is both pro-growth and pro-consumption (Glasson 2012). 
EM argues that the economy will benefit from a move to environmentalism and thereby reproduces 
neoliberal capitalism in a ‘green’ way. Weak applications aim to enhance market competitiveness 
and address the environment as a secondary concern (Christoff 2000:212). Weak EM approaches 
are only superficially ecological. Economic greenwashing, a marketing technique that functions to 
promote the perception that business or industry policies are eco-friendly, is often employed in EM. 
This gives the appearance of a substantiative move toward environmentalism while maintaining the 
ecologically destructive practices of business-as-usual (Ferguson 2009:298). EM is a means to 
discursively overcome the contradictions between ecology and capitalism. Therefore, it fails to 
generate meaningful action on climate change. 
Economic Rationalism: 
Economic rationalism refers to the primacy of economic phenomena for explaining the 
environment. Within this analysis, ER also features clauses that have solely economic objectives.  
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Justice: 
Justice is used as an umbrella term to encapsulate a variety of discourses concerned with fairness, 
namely climate justice, environmental justice and intergenerational justice , , , . National 25 26 27 28
Platform clauses addressing the disproportionate burden of climate change on low-income 
households, geographically vulnerable communities and minority groups fall within this category. 
Climate Science: 
Climate science refers to clauses expressed in a matter-of-fact manner according to international 
scientific consensus. These do not appear to have an ideological standing.  
The five discourses and their respective discourse coalitions, induced for the purpose of this study, 
are defined and demonstrated in Figure 1 (below) with examples from the National Platforms.  
 Climate Justice is based on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 25
(UNFCCC)(1992) standard that countries should address the climate crisis ‘on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, 
(Bernstein 2011:144). 
 Environmental Justice originated in the United States to refer to the unequal distribution of 26
environmental degradation which unfairly impacted racial minorities (Bullard 1990). 
 Intergenerational Justice refers to the temporal, non-overlapping, moral obligations owed to past 27
and future generations (Kassner 2011:540). 
 Clauses relating to the effects of climate change on human health were also grouped into the 28
category of justice. This phenomena cannot be explained through an alternative accepted 
academic discourse, such as climate justice or environmental justice. 
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Figure 1. Discursive Frameworks 
Discourse  Definition Example Coalition
Environmentalism 
Concern about, and 
action aimed at, 
protecting the 
environment. 
Labor supports the 
promotion of less 
greenhouse-intensive 
forms of transport, 
including public 
transport, cycling and 
walking.  
- Np44:Cl36.
• Environmentalists  
• Climate Activists  
• Get-Up! 
Sustainable 
Development 
Development that meets 
the needs of the present 
without compromising 
the ability of future 
generations to meet their 
needs. 
Labor is committed to 
maximising the social, 
economic and 
environmental benefits 
that flow from the 
sustainable management 
of Australia’s forests.  
- Np45:Cl83. 
• Renewables Industry
Ecological Modernisation 
Business-as-usual 
masquerading as a 
substantive move toward 
environmentalism. 
Labor will support high 
carbon emitting 
industries to become 
more energy efficient 
and reduce emissions.  
- Np47:Cl27. 
• Businesses  
• Corporations  
• Mining Industry 
Economic Reductionism Primacy of economic objectives. 
The continued 
development of new 
technology to improve 
the economic and 
environmental efficiency 
of energy production and 
consumption is vital to 
Australia’s long-term 
international 
competitiveness.  
- Np46:Cl55. 
• Mining Industry  
• Emissions-Intensive 
Trade Exposed 
Industries
Justice 
Concern about the 
unequal burden of 
climate change. 
Labor wants equity 
within Australia as we 
move to address climate 
change and is ensuring 
that low and middle 
income earners do not 
carry a disproportionate 
burden of our transition 
to a low carbon 
economy.  
- Np46:Cl7.
• Farmers  
• Trade Unions  
• Social Justice Groups  
Climate Science Scientific consensus on climate change. 
Labor recognises there 
is overwhelming 
scientific evidence that 
climate change caused 
by greenhouse gas 
emissions is making 
Australia hotter, the 
oceans warmer and our 
major cities and towns 
drier.  
-  Np44:Cl7. 
• Scientists 
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4. What? 
Quantitative Research: Semantic Content Analysis 
Every three years, the Australian Labor Party reviews its values and program for government at its 
National Conference. The decisions reached during this three-day event are published as a 
National Platform and Constitution. A chapter on the environment is a standard inclusion therein. 
The publicly available National Platforms from the 44th, 45th, 46th and 47th National Conferences 
document the party’s unified proposals for climate change action and key environmental priorities 
throughout the Australian Labor Government from 2007-2013. They also contain the ALP’s policy 
platform for the following term. These four publications contain consistent attitudes and policies on 
water, biodiversity, coastal protection, land and agriculture, natural and built heritage and living 
environments, and demonstrate the ALP’s commitment to responsible national leadership on 
environmental matters. The evolution of ideas contained by these documents demonstrates 
changing party priorities and suggests where its interests lay. The National Platforms were 
subjected to a semantic content analysis as the quantitative portion of this mixed methods 
research study.  
A. Results 
44th National Platform (2007) 
The 44th National Platform discusses key ALP environmental priorities in a generalised manner. 
The platform is not concerned with current issues or climate policy. It makes broad statements 
about water, biodiversity, coastal protection, land and agriculture, natural and built heritage, and 
living environments.  
Its most notable feature is the inclusion of the ‘Precautionary Principle’ as a Labor Party principle, 
which it defines as,  
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“…that if there is a high risk of serious or irreversible adverse impacts resulting from 
resource use, use should only be permitted if those impacts can be mitigated or there 
are overwhelming grounds for proceeding in the national interests. The absence of 
scientific certainty should not be a reason for postponing measures to prevent or 
mitigate negative impacts,”  (Np44:Cl6). ,  29 30
The Precautionary Principle is an international guideline for climate change action established in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Article 3.3 in the UNFCCC 1992). 
Similarly to the ALP variation, this Precautionary Principle is concerned ‘where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage’ (UNFCCC 2006:25). It states that ‘a lack of scientific evidence 
should not be used as a reason to postpone measures’ to prevent environmental degradation 
(UNFCCC 2006:25). As a project in normative ethics, the Precautionary Principle is especially vital 
where decision-makers are not those vulnerable to the morally unacceptable outcomes of 
dangerous climate change (Gardiner 2011:402). 
There are no mentions of the Precautionary Principle in any of the following National Platforms. 
Regarding sustainable industries and cleaner production, the platform proposes State and Territory 
producer responsibility schemes and voluntary economic measures to address post-consumption 
waste management (Np44:Cl133).  
The ALP supports the phase-out of plastic bags with a legislated ban if necessary (Np44:Cl134). 
Although the ALP won government shortly after the publication of the 44th National Platform, it did 
not translate this environmental priority into a policy. The phase-out of single-use plastic bags only 
occurred in June 2018 under a corporate initiative by Woolworths and Coles (Zhou 2018). 
 This excerpt is a single clause. All clauses in each National Platform are written in a similar style. 29
This is an example of what is meant by the term ‘clause’ in this paper. Please also see footnote 24. 
 The clauses discussed within this analysis are referenced by their platform and clause number. 30
For example, National Platform 44, Clause 6 is denoted as Np44:Cl6. 
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45th National Platform (2009) 
  
The 45th National Platform was the first in fifteen years published under an ALP Government.  31
Therefore, its content is largely policy-oriented. In contrast to the previous platform, it addresses 
current issues rather than making broad statements about the environment and the ALP’s values.   
The central focus of the chapter is the transition to a low pollution economy, wherein a large role is 
prescribed for farmers and primary industries in delivering policy-outcomes and adapting to climate 
change (Np45:Cl47-56).  By 2009, Australian farmers had endured years of water scarcity caused 32
by low rainfall and low river inflows in the extreme weather event which came to be known as the 
Millennium Drought (BOM 2015). In this context, the National Platform subchapter on water 
reframes water scarcity as a proxy for climate change (Np45:Cl57-65; Gascoigne 2008:523). 
Problems associated with the overallocation of water are exacerbated by climate change, the 
effects of which are felt disproportionately by vulnerable communities. The farming community is 
particularly affected by periods of low rainfall, but rather than focus on the agriculture industry in 
the 45th National Conference and Platform, the ALP framed its priorities around the individual. The 
focus on ‘farmers’ rather than ‘agriculture’ marks a shift in party interests. It focuses on the needs 
of families, prescribing welfare assistance and meeting environmental challenges through 
innovative farming practices.  
Labor also pledges to support economic growth through the creation of ‘Green Collar’ jobs 
(Np45:Cl33). This initiative is paired with the promise of improvements to emissions-intensive 
industries to increase their efficiency (Np45:Cl34). Again, the individual worker is prioritised. The 
onus to act is deferred from the government level, enabled through ‘employment opportunities’. 
While the local-level focus of the 45th National Platform enforces the enduring Labor Party motto of 
 The 45th National Platform includes a subchapter titled ‘The Liberal Legacy of Neglect on 31
Climate Change’. This was excluded from the analysis, as it does not contain the same style of 
normative or descriptive clauses as the rest of the document, in order to prevent it from skewing 
the data. 
 The 45th National Platform does not define ‘low pollution economy’. The trope and its variations, 32
such as ‘low pollution future’ and ‘low carbon economy’, appear in 10% of its clauses. The steps 
outlined for the transition from a high to low pollution economy include the implementation of the 
CPRS and the creation of new industries. 
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‘a fair go’ for all Australians in the face of climate change, it defers responsibility away from the 
nation’s biggest polluters.  
The solution proposed for Australia’s emissions-intensive industries is Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS)(Np45:Cl27). By capturing and holding carbon emissions in a storage site, business-
as-usual can persist without any additional carbon entering the atmosphere. However, ten years 
on, this mechanism is still only a concept (CSIRO 2019; NSW Gov 2019). CCS is currently in the 
development stage and is projected to become commercially available after 2050 (Treasury in 
Pearse, R. 2016a:326). Current models project that global carbon-emissions must peak and 
decrease by 50% by 2050 if CO2 levels are to stabilise at their current level (Pearse, G. 2009:15). 
Being both technologically and economically impractical (Pearse, R. 2016a:326), CCS has done 
more to clean up the reputation of coal than mitigate the effects of carbon on the environment 
(Pearse, G. 2009:37). While CCS did not appear in any subsequent National Platforms, it remains 
the favoured mitigation strategy of the fossil-fuel industry.  
46th National Platform (2011) 
A green growth approach to climate change is evident in the title of the 46th National Platform.  33
The title, ‘A Clean Energy Future’, implies that energy generation will be free from harmful 
externalities in the distant future, thereby displacing the need for urgent action on climate change. 
Tropes such as ‘clean’ or ‘green’ function to reframe business-as-usual, disguising damaging 
corporate practices so they appear consistent with current environmental objectives. They avoid 
substantial systemic reform by constructing a discourse of alternative truths enabling the blameless 
reproduction and growth of emissions-intensive industries, notably fossil-fuel industry expansion 
and the myth of clean coal (Stegemann and Ossewaarde 2018:27). The National Platform argues 
for ‘clean’ environments, communities, economies, technologies, infrastructure, jobs and industries 
to ‘reshape the economy and cut carbon pollution’ (Np46:throughout). 
 The 46th National Platform includes a subchapter titled ‘Labor Achievements’. This was 33
excluded from the analysis as, it does not contain the same style of normative or descriptive 
clauses as the rest of the document, in order to prevent it from skewing the data. 
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The ALP aimed to ‘drive the biggest expansion in the clean energy sector’ (Np46:Cl28) by putting a 
price on carbon and establishing the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) and the Australian 
Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA). Both CEFC and ARENA still operate with ongoing success. 
Both organisations continue to profitably invest into a varied portfolio of renewable energy projects 
and technologies (Np46:Cl28; CEFC 2019; ARENA 2019). While successful in these new ‘clean’ 
developments, the ALP did little to change existing dirty energy providers. The Clean Energy Act 
exempted the nation’s largest polluters to the total of 104 million and 98 million carbon units in 
2012-13 and 2013-14 respectively under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program (CER 2015; CER 
2017). The Clean Energy Act was repealed in 2014 by the Abbott Government.  
Similarly to the previous platform, the 46th edition is concerned with ‘equity to ensure low to middle 
income earners do not carry a disproportionate burden of the transition to a low carbon economy’, 
(Np46:Cl7). Exemplified in this clause, the strong socio-environmental justice focus exceeds that of 
any other National Platforms.  Nearly 30% of all clauses are framed as matters of justice with 34
specific reference to the regional mining communities based in Hunter, Latrobe and Illawarra, as 
well as families and pensioners in general (Np46:Cl21,22). The ALP proposed to ‘look after’ those 
vulnerable by redistributing Carbon Price revenue and through further tax reform.  
The National Platform endorses an ethical standard for emissions-intensive energy generation: 
‘energy supply and use must be sustainable, economical and competitive to the extent it meets the 
highest operational and environmental standards of the coal seam gas industry’ (Np46:Cl52). The 
National Platform does not reference any national or international guidelines, nor does it provide 
any to industry. It proposes that the industry adhere to self-determined limits. Without objectivity or 
enforceability, this clause lacks substance and thus enables industries to greenwash their carbon-
intensive interests. Like CCS in the previous National Platform, coal seam gas is a means to 
maintain business-as-usual for fossil-fuel industries. The dissonance between the interests of 
extractive polluters and environmental conservation in the 46th National Platform demonstrates the 
dominance of fossil-fuels over the climate for the ALP’s second term in office. 
 See footnote 24, page 28, for the use of the term ‘clause’ as the sampling element. 34
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47th National Platform (2014) 
The final National Platform was published by an ALP in Opposition nearly two years after Tony 
Abbott became Prime Minister with the LNP Government. Its content is primarily issues-based and 
shies from policymaking, a logical finding due to the ALP’s inability to introduce bills to the House 
of Representatives without executive power.  
The Great Barrier Reef receives singular attention in a subchapter to the 47th National Platform. 
Therein, reef health is addressed as central to the nation’s culture, society, economy, and tourism. 
These ecological priorities relate to preserving species biodiversity and combatting climate change 
(Np47:Cl41-43).  
Support for protection of Cape York is also mentioned in the 47th National Platform and all earlier 
National Platforms. The ALP considers it a national and world heritage priority to protect the area 
(Np47:Cl39). Cape York is home to the Rio-Tinto Amrun, Glencore Aurukun and Metro Bauxite Hills 
bauxite mining projects which occupy indigenous land (Drummond 2017). The consistent pursuit of 
heritage status for the peninsula shows that native title and environmental preservation are of 
ongoing importance to the ALP. The Labor Party reaffirmed its commitment to gain World Heritage 
status for Cape York ahead of the federal election in May 2019, pledging to work with indigenous 
communities to achieve a balance between social and economic development (Owens and 
McKenna 2019).  
Another notable feature in the 47th National Platform is the omission of a clause featured in the 
editions at the time of Labor Government. The 45th and 46th platforms state,  
“Labor believes a key part of reaching a global solution involves decoupling economic 
growth from emissions growth, a priority which has particular resonance for developing 
countries, which have a right to promote sustainable economic development and raise 
living standards,” (Np45:Cl26; Np476:Cl43).  
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This normative statement calls for alternative drivers of economic growth to replace the traditional 
emissions-intensive practices of business and industry that have become entrenched in Australia’s 
national politics and economics. The act of ‘decoupling’, alongside reference to developing 
countries, suggests that the ALP is in favour of mass-system restructuring so that national and 
international reliance on Australian coal is reduced. With coal being the nation’s largest export, the 
majority of which is to developing countries (Moss 2016:504), the decoupling of economic growth 
and emissions would require Australia to limit its export trade of this commodity. However, the 47th 
National Platform does not feature this, indicating that this clause, once a priority for the Australian 
Labor Party, is no longer.  
Finally, the 47th National Platform clearly identifies key stakeholders involved in the development 
of the Australian Labor Party’s environmental priorities.   
“Labor is informed by scientists, economists, environmental and climate stakeholders, 
farmers, business, industry and governments,” (Np47:Cl7). 
This clause affirms the research findings of ‘who?’ are the key political actors involved with the 
ALP, and thus reveals potential influences on Labor Government climate change policy. 
B. Analysis  
Political Actors and Discourse Coalitions 
Quantitative Semantic Content Analysis  
The National Platforms spanning the years of and around the Labor Government are analysed for 
their underlying moods and attitudes using a semantic content coding method. The quantitative 
data collected from this research study reveals the extent to which emergent discourse coalitions 
are influential to the Labor Government by quantifying the clauses that corresponded to each 
category. Environmentalism, sustainable development (SD), ecological modernisation (EM), 
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economic rationalism (ER), justice and climate science are the major discursive frameworks used 
to describe the underlying moods and attitudes of the National Platforms.  
The manner in which the ALP’s environmental priorities are discussed changes over the course of 
the Labor Government. The changes in the use of each discursive framework is shown in Figure 2 
and Figure 3.  
Figure 2. Prevalence of Environmental Discourses
Figure 3. Prevalence of Environmental Discourses (Graphic) 
Edition Year Chapter Title Moods
44th Circa 2007
Combating Climate Change and 
Building a Sustainable 
Environment
27% Environmentalism  
21% Sustainable Development  
18% Ecological Modernisation 
45th Circa 2009 Tackling Climate Change and our Environmental Challenges 
29% Ecological Modernisation  
25% Justice 
18% Sustainable Development  
46th Circa 2011 A Clean Energy Future 
31% Justice  
18% Ecological Modernisation  
16% Economic Rationalism 
47th Circa 2014 Tackling Climate Change and our Environmental Challenges 
21% Justice   
21% Environmentalism  
17% Ecological Modernisation 
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The 44th National Platform, which demonstrates concern about Australia’s unique natural 
environment, is framed through environmentalism. The greatest percentage of clauses (27%) are 
concerned with protecting the environment and are dictated by the one-off ALP value, the 
Precautionary Principle. The next dominant frame is sustainable development (21%) followed by 
ecological modernisation  (18%). The categories defined in Figure 1 range from altruistic concern 
for environmental protection to purely economic objectives. Sustainable development is less 
ecological than environmentalism, and ecological modernisation is less ecological than sustainable 
development. As Figure 3 shows, the order of environmental discourses in the 44th National 
Platform declines in its ecological focus. This sequence shows that the environment was of 
paramount concern to the ALP in 2007.  
The tendency toward eco-centric discourses in the 44th National Platform is demonstrated by the 
declining trend of clauses framed by environmentalism, SD and EM. As shown in Figure 1, this 
lexicon is employed by environmentalist and climate advocacy groups active in the community. 
They operate in cooperation with the grassroots members of the ALP, alongside subnational, 
national and transnational organisations. The use of this discourse demonstrates the influence of a 
number of community groups, think tanks and not-for-profit (NFP) groups. The state-funded, 
farmer-based conservationist group, Landcare, is of significant grassroots influence in the 
characteristic bottom-up policymaking process of the ALP. Its efforts to repair rural landscapes and 
support the uptake of sustainable farming practices are briefly acknowledged in two statements of 
the National Platform (Np44:Cl82,83), explicitly showing the influence of Landcare on the ALP. 
Other prominent organisations party to the Australian environment movement include Greenpeace 
Australia-Pacific, Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC), Friends of the Earth, Wilderness 
Society (TWS), Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) 
and GetUp! (Christoff 2016:1038).  35
A major discursive shift occurred in the environmental priorities of the Australian Labor Party when 
it was elected to government in late 2007. The party had previously framed its values and platform 
through eco-centric discourses centred around altruistic concern for Australia’s natural environment 
 The national Landcare movement was driven by the Australian Conservation Foundation which 35
lobbied the Hawke Government in 1989 (Landcare 2019). 
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and unique biodiversity. The 45th National Platform, published after almost two years in office, 
reflects the responsibility of the Labor Government to its constituency and its desire for reelection 
the following year. The frame of abstract environmentalism is supplanted with real social and 
economic concerns resulting in a 29% use of references associated with ecological modernisation. 
The ALP environmental priorities are consistent with business-as-usual. They aim to maintain the 
growth of the carbon economy and deliver the least-cost mitigation strategy. Of the 126 clauses, 
15% are concerned with ‘managing’ the environment and climate change. This suggests that the 
ALP is becoming increasingly professionalised as business principles such as managerial 
effectiveness come to dictate party competition (Halpin 2015:109). Party professionalisation has 
also resulted in a waning ideology. As a result, bipartisan neoliberalism has permeated all aspects 
of public policy, ranging from market nonintervention to economic reductionist approaches to 
externalities (Rickards et al. 2014:758; Miller and Orchard 2014:7). Business and industry that 
have a vested interest in the maintenance of the status-quo are obvious sources of this discursive 
framework.  
As the source of approximately 16% of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions (Sudmeyer 2019), 
agriculture is one industry that favours business-as-usual over government interventionism. The 
discursive shift from ‘agriculture’ to ‘farmer’, however, marks a shift in ALP priorities in favour of the 
individual over industry, and aligns with the secondary framework of justice. Approximately 25% of 
all clauses are concerned with the unequal burden of climate change on individuals and 
households. As each clause was coded for only the single most relevant category, the overlap 
between social and economic priorities is obscured. Many of the clauses related to the individual 
are favourable to industry also, for example the directive to work in partnership with energy 
suppliers to improve energy access to households (Np45:Cl40). This does not, however, hinder the 
research objective of identifying key interests via corresponding discourse coalitions. The influence 
of farmers and social justice groups are revealed in the justice trend. As is evident throughout the 
National Platforms in Figures 2 and 3, the reorientation of Labor Party priorities toward the social 
and economic public interest coincides with the electoral pressures of being in government.  36
Having been a decisive issue in the 2007 election (Gascoigne 2008), climate change remained a 
 The changes in the National Platforms are outlined in Chapter 4A: Results (pages 32-38). 36
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vital policy priority for the ALP but needed to be framed in a manner which resonated with the 
public, business and industry.  
The upward trend in the discursive use of justice in the 46th National Platform is consistent with 
that of the previous edition. A six percent increase in the number of environmental clauses 
concerned with equity and equality reveals a return to the social democratic origins of the 
Australian Labor Party. This rises to an unprecedented 31% of clauses framed through justice in 
the 46th National Platform, the highest concentration of any discourse in any of the National 
Platforms. The influence of trade union groups, community based organisations and social rights 
advocates can be identified within this discourse coalition. Reference to the unequal burden of 
climate change on farmers, indigenous peoples, households, future generations and workers in the 
mining industry is further evidence hereof. The chapter strives for ‘A Clean Energy Future’, 
objectified in its title. It aims to deliver justice for current and future generations that are dependent 
on out-dated, emissions-intensive methods of energy generation. Justice includes facilitating the 
transition of mining workers and communities to new forms of employment and industry (Cheung 
and Davies 2017:104). These individuals are made particularly vulnerable in the renewable energy 
transition as their livelihood is dependent on coal-fired energy production. The ALP directive to 
‘work with industry and the relevant unions to ensure proper processes are in place to manage 
employee-related issues’ reveals the influence of mining unions (Np46:Cl14c). Hence, the 
discourse coalition that employs justice entails a wide range of interests that do not necessarily 
prioritise the environment in climate change policymaking and could present a barrier to the 
creation of meaningful mitigation policy.  
The 46th National Platform features a notable 11% decrease in ecological modernisation matched 
by an 11% increase in economic rationalism. This discursive shift does not manifest clause to 
clause; rather it occurs across the entire platform, indicating a change in key influences on the ALP 
from those represented by the ER discourse coalition. The discursive shift from EM to ER is 
relatively minor due to the minute differences between either macroeconomic frame. While both 
discourses feature the economy as central, the former requires economic activities to align with 
environmental practices whereas the latter is based purely on economic explanations (Figure 1). 
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For example, EM frames the directive to help high carbon industries to become more energy 
efficient and reduce emissions (Np46:Cl50), while ER frames the directive to make Australia’s 
energy supply sustainable, economically efficient, and internationally competitive for sustained 
economic growth (Np46:Cl53).  Approximately 23% of clauses featured ‘clean’ or ‘green’ -washed 37
versions of business-as-usual which lack substance beyond a statement of objectives. Without a 
plan outlining this transition, such clauses enable business, industry and the ALP to appear more 
environmentally friendly than they really are.  
Alongside the influence of key political actors on ALP climate policy, the change in leadership is 
another explanation for this discursive shift. Prime Minister Julia Gillard favoured the use of market 
tools as policy mechanisms to support and advance the free-market economy, unlike her 
predecessor Kevin Rudd whom was critical of aspects of neoliberalism (Johnson 2011:568). 
Gillard’s neoliberal ideology also implicates discourse coalitions that may favour her preferred 
neoliberal mitigation strategies as their influence on both her and the Government is evident in the 
46th National Platform and similar party-authorised publications.  
Finally, the 47th National Platform is framed through justice and environmentalism (both 21%), 
marking a partial return to the generalised priorities - and interests - of the ALP before its time in 
government. Of those analysed, this platform has more in common with the 44th edition published 
prior to the ALP’s electoral success than to those published later during the Labor Government. 
Similarly concerned with preserving Australia’s unique natural environment via the discourse of 
environmentalism, it also corresponds with the discourse coalitions identified in the 44th National 
Platform. Furthermore, key aforementioned political actors including business, industry, mining 
trade unions and farmers are not as prominent as they were in the latter two editions. As interest 
groups must strive to achieve their policy objectives via political parties, specifically those with 
executive, policymaking power, Labor’s exit from government is one explanation for this discursive 
shift (Halpin and Fraussen 2018:382).  
 Generally speaking, clauses featuring the term ‘sustainability’ were grouped into the category of 37
sustainable development. Clauses featuring the terms ‘renewable’ or ‘efficiency’ were grouped into 
ecological modernisation. These coding rules were used as a rough guideline and did not overwrite 
the content and context of each clause. 
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Australian Labor in the 47th National Platform acknowledges its key political influences are 
scientists, economists, environmental and climate stakeholders, farmers, business and industry 
(Np47:Cl7). However, some have a greater impact than others in this particular platform. Business 
and industry only emerge as vested interests through ecological modernisation in 17% of the 
National Platform, whilst the other actors collectively informed 42% of all clauses.  Thus, there is a 38
clear difference in the prevailing interests within the final National Platform, specifically a weaker 
influence of market-centric political actors compared with previous editions published during the 
Labor Government.  
 Clauses framed using environmentalism and justice (21% + 21%) comprised 42% of all clauses. 38
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5. Who?  
Qualitative Research: Elite Interviews 
The elite interview sample is comprised of ALP Members of Parliament who played a central role in 
climate change policymaking during the Labor Governments of 2007-2013. Wayne Swan, Joel 
Fitzgibbon, Peter Garrett and Greg Combet were asked about their experiences and opinions 
relating to climate policy during this period. Upon their request, the interviews of Swan and Garrett 
were supplemented by their respective memoirs, The Good Fight (2014) and Big Blue Sky (2015). 
Julia Gillard also offered her memoir, My Story (2014), but declined an interview.   39
A. Results 
Interview 1 -  Wayne Swan 
Former Treasurer and Deputy Leader of the Labor Government, Wayne Swan was a central 
decision-maker on climate policy during both the Rudd and Gillard regimes (Gillard 2014:366).  40
He constituted one-third, alongside Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, and Minister for Climate Change, 
Energy Efficiency and Water, Penny Wong, of the unofficial policymaking organ which came to be 
known internally as ‘the Troika’ during the Rudd Government (Gillard 2014:366). He was renowned 
as the 'last man in parliament' from the Rudd-Gillard years until he retired from politics following the 
Labor electoral defeat in May 2019, ending a 40 year career with the ALP (Maley 2019). Swan 
made clear in his memoir, The Good Fight, that powerful vested interests associated with the 
Liberal-National Coalition employed every conceivable measure to discredit the Labor Government 
and increase their profit margins (Swan 2014:336).  
 The interview questions and transcripts can be found in the appendix.39
 Any unattributed quotations are from the interview with Wayne Swan on 11/07/2019. 40
 !45
The mining sector was successful in abolishing the Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT) in early 
2010, which was designed to collect a return on the nation’s natural resources (Swan 2014:204; 
Henry in McKnight and Hobbes 2013:311). The RSPT was intended to compromise for the low 
effective company tax rate paid by miners in 2008-2009 which averaged 15% compared with the 
corporate tax rate of 25% (Swan 2014:334). The wealth it generated would be redistributed to the 
community so that all Australians, not just the multibillion dollar mining sector, would benefit from 
this common good (Swan 2014:204). The response from vested interests was immense. This 
policy was met with a disinformation campaign by the mining industry that exaggerated the 
mechanism and its outcomes beyond its intended application. Swan writes,  
“They yelled about a 57% tax rate… when this would have applied to only a handful of 
mines that were earning returns to their shareholders in the vicinity of 400%,” and “The 
same miners who publicly claimed that they would have to close their mines were 
quietly expanding their operations…” (Swan 2014:334).  
Outwardly, mining companies threatened shutdown and called for governmental consultation while 
simultaneously expanding operations and dodging meetings (Swan 2014:213). They staged talks 
with the LNP ‘designed for the TV cameras’ (213) in an effort to discredit the Labor Government 
and ‘scare the hell out of the community’ (206). The industry also held a Billionaires Rally against 
the RSPT attended by the country’s wealthiest individuals, mining moguls Gina Rinehart and 
Andrew Forrest. Swan denounced the ‘absurdity, hypocrisy and moral obscenity’ of the event which 
aimed to secure a resource that belongs to the nation and its citizens in the hands of the few (314). 
In his interview, Swan argued that ‘vested interests’ concerned with taxation were also against 
climate change action. He listed mining companies, energy-intensive industries and the finance 
sector, which is “sympathetic to the [emissions-intensive industry’s] cause”, as the main offenders. 
These three big groups made a superficial commitment to climate change mitigation, but when 
long-term structural reform conflicted with their short-term profit, the latter imperative “won every 
time”. In terms of action on climate change, the Gillard Government was able to get the second 
ETS, the Clean Energy Act, through the House of Representatives despite opposition by business. 
 !46
This was not without consequences. Its opponents responded with “populist politics” by “taking out 
newspaper advertisements - slagging [Swan] off across the board”.  
Despite the hostility of some, the Labor Government tried to involve all relevant stakeholders. 
Swan recalled the months ahead of both emission-trading schemes were filled with meetings with 
big investors in the economy. In 2011, the Gillard Government convened a Business Roundtable 
on Climate Change which was embraced enthusiastically by business executives, yet undermined 
by the Business Council of Australia (BCA). This industry association of leaders from 144 
companies, including mining giants BHP and Rio Tinto, and the major four banks (BCA 2019), 
arrived to the negotiations with unreasonable demands and no will to compromise (Swan 
2014:339). Swan recounted a similar experience with the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA). 
Whilst the MCA stated its support for a joint-venture in reforming the royalties regime, the fate of 
the mining tax confirms their preference for an inefficient royalties system (Swan 2014:209). 
Behind closed doors, Swan said, the MCA is basically run by mining giant BHP. It is the “most 
influential private vested interest”, representing the nation’s largest mining companies.  
These vested interests did not penetrate the Australian Labor Party. Some of its members, notably 
conservatives from the Right faction with an ideological preference for maintaining the status-quo, 
“were understandably sympathetic to the cause [of vested interests]”. Nonetheless, the ALP was 
united on emissions-reduction. Interest groups successfully negotiated financial concessions to 
industry. Subsidies and exemptions were justified by the ALP as necessary for the practical 
implementation of the policy. Swan explained the gap between the Garnaut Review (2008) and the 
CPRS White Paper (2008) as the difference between the “theoretical presentation of one scholar” 
and the “practical implementation of a sustainable policy”. Whilst the Garnaut Review prescribed 
an ‘economically pure’ emissions trading scheme wherein ‘no identifiable circumstances would 
justify the free allocation of permits’, many concessions were made in the final government White 
Paper (Macintosh Et Al. 2010:203). The White Paper planned to exempt deforestation completely, 
agriculture temporarily, and furthermore provide financial assistance to polluters (Macintosh et al. 
2010:203). The final policy awarded concessions to the emissions intensive industries to the value 
of $48-83 billion over the next decade (Macintosh et al. 2010:208).  
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Swan’s rationale for these concessions to industry was that “you can’t close down the economy”. 
He said, “it is ludicrous to think you can close down large industries”, when asked not about 
industry closure, but about the reason for carbon credits granted to the emissions-intensive sector. 
Furthermore, he criticised the problematic role of purists in carbon-reduction policymaking for being 
unconcerned with the immediate fall-out or impact on ordinary people and communities. For Swan, 
so-called “purists” are proponents of an ecocentric discourse, including environmental advocates, 
the Left and the Greens Party. Purists advocated for full implementation immediately and 
renewable energy system transformation, he criticised, despite the “existence of alternatives”. 
Swan suggested carbon sequestration as an alternative although this mechanism is decades from 
being commercially viable (Treasury in Pearse, R. 2016a:326).  
The National Platforms were of little significance to Swan. In the interview, he was dismissive of 
emerging trends in Labor Party priorities, stating that the fact an industry was more prevalent in 
one platform than in another meant nothing. A case in point is the Precautionary Principle, berated 
by Swan as nonsense. When asked about its inclusion and subsequent exclusion in the National 
Platforms, he responded “it sounds barking mad and probably should not have been there in the 
first place!” Swan discredits the National Conferences and Platforms as the key agenda-setting 
instruments for the ALP’s beliefs, values and program for government (ALP 2019).  
Interview 2 - Joel Fitzgibbon  
Member for Hunter, Joel Fitzgibbon, served as Minister for Defence and Minister for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry during the Rudd and Gillard Labor Governments.  As the then Chief 41
Government Whip in the House of Representatives, he was tasked with maintaining discipline 
among fellow ALP Members of Parliament in the House of Representatives.  
The electorate of Hunter is financially dependent on coal-mining and coal-fired power generation, 
with 40 mines employing approximately 9,000 workers in the region (Miskelly 2019). As a result, 
 Any unattributed quotations are from the interview with Joel Fitzgibbon on 15/07/2019. 41
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the electorate is politically sensitive to the climate change debate, evident in large swings against 
Labor at the height of this issue, notably 8.8% in 2013 (ABC 2013) and 9.5% in 2019 (ABC 2019). 
According to Fitzgibbon, although Hunter is becoming more progressive, it is guided by economic 
costs to the community and therefore rejects the ALP when it is perceived to be anti-coal mining. 
The future of the electorate and its miners have always been Fitzgibbon’s central concern. 
Following the 2019 federal election, Fitzgibbon promised to preserve the future of Hunter by 
contesting ALP leadership if the next candidate failed to guarantee political support for coal and 
regional Australia (Maher 2019).  
Fitzgibbon is aligned with the right-wing faction of the ALP, Centre Unity. In the interview, he 
explained that Centre Unity does not formally interact with interest groups or activists. With regard 
to the climate change debate, Fitzgibbon stated that the Right tries to balance emissions-reduction 
with economic development to ensure the retention and growth of jobs in the economy. It “ensures 
that we don’t overreach”. This is important as “overreach typically consigns [the ALP] to 
Opposition”.  
The rationale for financial concessions to industry, according to Fitzgibbon, was to be able to sell 
the policy to the Australian people. Alongside industry, compensation was provided for pensioners, 
low-income earners and emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries. The Gillard Government 
also raised the tax-free threshold to ensure “compensation went to everyone” (Gillard 2014:388). 
Unfortunately, this rationale was not successful as the Clean Energy Act, dubbed the ‘carbon tax’, 
was unpopular nationwide.  
Despite being a centre of coal-mining activity, Fitzgibbon did not recall any substantial protests 
having taken place in the electorate of Hunter. There was little presence of pro- and anti-mitigation 
activists, possibly because the electorate has always been so supportive of coal. “Their efforts 
would be better invested elsewhere”, he speculated. He did not recall the presence of union 
organisations such as the CFMMEU or the MCA, nor did he encounter any environmentalist 
activity apart from the recent Youth Climate Strike in Newcastle on March 15 ahead of the 2019 
federal election.  
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While he remembered little of the 2007-2013 Labor Government, he commented on the behaviour 
of interest groups during the 2019 election campaign. He identified the Labor Environment Action 
Network (LEAN), a grassroots network of ALP members committed to action on climate change 
(LEAN 2019), as having been influential on ALP policy. Regardless, he described the ALP climate 
change policy ahead of the 2019 election as having a “light touch” compared with the robust CPRS 
under Rudd and Clean Energy Act under Gillard.  
Interview 3 - Peter Garrett   
Peter Garrett, environmentalist and Lead Singer of Midnight Oil, served as the Labor Member for 
Kingsford-Smith during the Labor Government. He was appointed as Minister for the Environment, 
Heritage and the Arts under the Rudd Leadership, and later, as the Minister for School Education, 
Early Childhood and Youth under Gillard. Before entering Federal Parliament, Garrett was the 
President of the national environment organisation, the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF). 
He was also a Board Member of leading independent environmental campaigning organisation, 
Greenpeace International. At the time of this study, Garrett was touring Europe with Midnight Oil 
and therefore agreed to respond to the interview questions via email.  
Within his interview, Garrett revealed that Labor Government climate policy attracted the lobbying 
efforts of industry and environmental groups alike. Garrett recalled that the BCA and the MCA were 
particularly active, as were the ACF and other environmental non-governmental organisations, but 
to a lesser extent. Mining companies swayed the political debate by funding media and advertising 
campaigns against the government. This is one example where environmental groups were 
outnumbered and outspent by industry. The antagonism of the efforts by pro- and anti-environment 
groups to influence the government was a source of tension in the creation of climate change 
policy. Similarly, Members of Parliament were at odds with one another over whether the resources 
industry should be shielded from carbon-reduction policy or if it could withstand a faster transition 
to a low-carbon economy. Garrett addressed the ‘perverse nature’ of the climate change debate in 
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his memoir, Big Blue Sky, stating that doubters within the Labor Cabinet were ‘always dropping 
dissent to the press gallery’ (Garrett 2015:343).  
Concerning the National Platforms, Garrett was always in favour of the Precautionary Principal. 
Garrett frequently referenced the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) 
Act (1999) during his appointment as Labor Minister for the Environment to block developments 
which threatened the natural environment, biodiversity and heritage (DEE 2019; Morton 2019).  42
He said, the omission of the Precautionary Principle from future National Platforms reflected the 
view of the Right faction. Garrett also attributed this change to the influence of powerful unions 
such as the CFMEU which, he said, were reluctant to advance true sustainability.  
Interview 4 - Greg Combet  
Former Labor Member for Charlton, Greg Combet’s political career began with the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU).  A coal-mining engineer by profession, he joined the peak union 43
body in Australia of 38 affiliated unions, which together represent 1.8 million workers. There he was 
employed for twenty years as a Union Official and as the Secretary (ACTU 2019; APH 2019). 
Within the ALP, Combet was Minister for Defence Materiel and Science to the Rudd Government, 
and later, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency to the Gillard Government (APH 
2019). Since leaving parliament, he has worked as a consultant to unions and is currently the Chair 
of Industry Super Australia and IFM Investors.  
During his ministerial appointments with the Labor Government, Combet witnessed the efforts of 
“every interest group known to human kind” to influence climate policy. Of this multitude of groups, 
he reported that business groups that would be adversely impacted by efforts to reduce emissions 
dominated the political arena. He said, “the coal industry was very persistent”. It commissioned 
research of questionable validity that produced alarmist projections on the effect of climate policy, 
 The EPBC Act (1999) legislates for environment and heritage protection and biodiversity 42
conservation. It is a national regulatory scheme that operates by issuing and approving permits 
(DEE 2019). 
 Any unattributed quotations are from the interview with Greg Combet on 05/08/2019. 43
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forecasting industry closure and job-loss in regional communities. Studies created to benefit the 
industry were cited in conjunction with election forecasts that the ALP was vulnerable to marginal 
seats. This escalated to threats, often by powerful international mining companies that did not want 
the national politics to interfere with their business objectives. Combet described these interactions 
as “brutal” and not unlike the behaviour of Big Tobacco in the fight against plain packaging 
legislation (Swan; Pearse, G. 2009:35). 
Concessions to the emissions-intensive industry were granted based on the macroeconomic, 
industry, regional and company-specific implications expected to result from reducing emissions, 
according to Combet. He pointed to the variety of emissions-intensive industries beyond the 
electricity sector. It includes steel-making, cement manufacturing, aluminium smelting and liquified 
natural gas, all of which would have to adjust to the climate policy. Concessions were to function to 
“phase-in” emissions-intensive sectors to the emissions-reduction scheme, thus allowing for a 
“just-transition”. Having held a senior position in the ACTU, Combet maintained a dialogue with the 
relevant unions to try to overcome the scare campaign by the LNP and the fossil-fuel industry 
against climate policy. He recounted that the coal mining union ultimately decided to hold a 
plebiscite on the ALP CPRS. It gained over 90% support from its members.  
Reflecting on the National Conferences and Platforms, former Climate Change Minister Combet 
said the ALP environmental priorities were in accordance with what was happening on the ground. 
However, he said, “there is also a practical reality for political parties”. The democratic process of 
Conference motivates idealism such that the constraints which come with being in government are 
not taken into account. Economic reality is the largest constraining factor to this purist sentiment. 
The Labor Government was “absolutely committed” to the transition from a carbon economy to a 
low-pollution future; Combet said, “we wouldn’t have put ourselves through all this pain”. However, 
the Labor Government was responsible to its constituency represented by various interest groups. 
While interest groups can be very powerful and influential, Combet said, that is how it should be. 
They are key to democracy and lead to sustainable public policy outcomes. 
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Biography 1 - Julia Gillard  
‘Our Atmosphere’, a chapter in the autobiography, My Story (2014), by former ALP Prime Minister, 
Julia Gillard, focusses on the effects of carbon-emissions on anthropogenic climate change and 
the policy her Cabinet created to counteract it. It recounts the process of climate change 
policymaking undertaken during 2007-2013, prior to and including her leadership in 2010-2013. 
Operating in the highly sensitive economic climate following the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-2008, the Rudd Government had to take into account a varied and conflicting range of 
stakeholders. While business interests were appeased by postponing the CPRS, dissatisfied 
environmentalists were compensated for this delay with a 10% increase in the national emissions-
reduction target.  Gillard attributed the CPRS defeat to an ‘unholy alliance’ between the Greens 44
and independents, Nick Xenophon and Sarah Fielding. They failed to put the national interest over 
their short-term politics and the ambition to look purer than the ALP in the eyes of environmental 
voters (Gillard 2014:368).  
The CEA did not suffer the same fate as the CPRS. Rather, the Greens were vital to the temporary 
success of the policy, having supported the passage of the bill through parliament after negotiating 
for investment in renewable energy and for funding into scientific research (Gillard 2014:388). 
Former ACTU Secretary and then Minister for Energy and Climate Change, Greg Combet, 
advocated for internationally-competitive businesses to be shielded from the full effects of the price 
on carbon. Advantages for farmers were arranged by Independent Tony Windsor to coincide with 
Carbon Farming and efficiency-enhancing initiatives. Household assistance was delivered 
universally by raising the tax-free threshold so that low- and middle-income earners gained the 
greatest advantage(388).    45
 The Labor Government increased the ERT to 25% by 2020 to stabilise pollution at 450ppm and 44
thus coincide with the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009 (Gillard 2014:367). 
 The tax-free threshold is the amount of money which an individual can earn before paying tax. 45
Prior to the ETS in 2011, the tax-free threshold was AUD$6000. The Labor Government tripled this 
amount to $18,200 as a mechanism to shield households from the economic spillover effects of the 
price on carbon (Gillard 2014:388). 
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In her autobiography, Prime Minister Gillard celebrates the fairness and pragmatism of the ETS 
created under her leadership, the Clean Energy Act (2011). In doing so, she acknowledges that the 
government has a responsibility to its stakeholders in policymaking. These stakeholders may be 
the usual suspects, namely scientists, economists, environmental and climate stakeholders, 
farmers, business, industry and governments, however this autobiographical chapter remains 
ambiguous about the influence of political actors on climate change mitigation.  
B. Analysis 
The Extent of Interest Group Influence  
Qualitative Surface Content Analysis  
The elite interview data, complemented with memoirs, was analysed qualitatively to identify the 
political actors who exerted influence over Labor Government climate policy and to what extent. 
The interview evidence provided by the Members of Parliament serves as a window into the private 
interactions of interest groups and the ALP on climate policy. 
The climate change policymaking arena was populated by a diverse variety of political actors. 
Business, industry, environmental and union groups operated in a highly coordinated manner to 
sway the policy in their favour. The coal-mining sector emerged as the biggest political player with 
a vested interest in reducing its emissions-reduction obligations. Unrivalled in its organisational 
size and lobbying budget, the persistent coal-mining sector engaged in “populist politics” (Swan) 
with the aim of discrediting the ALP leadership and its mitigation schemes. It employed news and 
advertising media to reach its objectives, broadcasting industry-funded research designed to 
favour the emissions-intensive industry alongside disinformation campaigns spreading 
‘fundamentally dishonest, hysterical figures’ about various Labor Government policies (Swan 2012; 
Courier Mail 2010). The MCA spent nearly $16 million in advertising against the RSPT in 2010 and 
$23 million against the Clean Energy Act in the financial year of 2011-2012 (Ker 2015). 
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While outsider pressure by the coal-mining sector generated doubt and dissent in the public, 
insider techniques were used to threaten the Labor Government. The MCA was careful to point out 
the political sensitivity of the climate change debate in regional electorates where the ALP held 
marginal seats. It warned of mass industry shut-down and job loss in these areas as an ultimatum 
to appease the mining sector (Swan). As policy implementation cannot occur from the Opposition, 
these threats to marginal seats were very serious. Large international mining companies, both in 
coal and other globally-traded mineral resources, went so far as to threaten complete industry 
withdrawal from Australia if their financial demands were not met (Combet). Behind closed doors, 
the coal-mining sector exerted immense pressure on the ALP to prevent any adverse impact on its 
commercial interests.  
Of the business and industry groups which pledged to reduce their carbon-emissions in partnership 
with the Labor Government, none were prepared to take real action on climate change if it was to 
the detriment of their short-term profits (Swan). These commitments were purely symbolic and 
therefore crumbled where policymaking was concerned. The BCA is one example of this, having 
upstaged the Business Roundtable on Climate Change after appearing enthusiastic to engage in 
negotiations (Swan 2014:339). The MCA under mining-giant BHP, which stated support for a joint-
venture on natural resources royalties reform and then campaigned against the RSPT, is another. 
These interest groups are Wayne Swan’s vested interests. The mining, finance and energy-
intensive sectors misrepresent their commercial self-interest as the national interest in order to 
highjack Australian politics (Pearse, G. 2009:38; Swan 2012). They are the key political actors who 
influenced Labor Government climate change mitigation policy.  
While ENGOs were similarly well-organised, they were largely outnumbered and outspent by their 
business and industry competitors (Garrett). Presenting the counterposition to industry groups, 
they were criticised by some as the purist problem with Australian climate change politics (Swan). 
According to Swan, the purist expression against financial subsidies, which demands an immediate 
transition to renewable energy, is recklessly unconcerned with the impact on ordinary people. Yet, 
the constraints and responsibilities of being in government go beyond environmental concerns. 
Further criticisms concerning the difference between the theoretical projections and practical reality 
 !55
of policymaking echo this argument. Regardless, the Labor Government was absolutely committed 
to facilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy “to have put themselves through all this pain”, 
(Combet).  
The rationale for financial concessions to emissions-intensive industries varied widely amongst the 
interviewees; each explanation has validity. Firstly, financial concessions were granted to avoid 
closing down the economy (Swan). While complete industry and economic shut-down is an 
extreme and rather unlikely effect of emissions-reduction obligations, it points to the major 
systemic reform implied by climate change mitigation policy. The nationwide coal-dependence that 
permeates politics requires a gradual transition to decouple economic growth from greenhouse 
gasses (Cheung and Davies 2017:104). Secondly, the concessions were a means to sell Labor 
Government climate change policy to the electorate (Fitzgibbon). Thirdly, they were a means to 
phase-in the Carbon Price (Combet). A gradual transition into a national ETS enhances the future 
sustainability and longevity of this major structural reform. It doubled as an incentive for business 
and industry to reduce emissions and encouraged those affected to embrace the policy. Finally, 
financial concessions satisfied the interests of relevant stakeholders (Gillard). In climate change 
policymaking, as in all areas of public policy, the government has a responsibility to its 
constituency, including the business and industry groups that drive a large portion of the economy.  
The ALP environmental priorities also received a mixed response from the Members of Parliament. 
While a majority of respondents displayed faith in the National Platforms as a democratic process 
representing the party’s values and objectives for government, one interviewee did not agree. 
Swan gave the pragmatic response that party politics happens on the ground, not in Conference. 
In contrast, his colleagues maintained that while there is a difference between theory and practice, 
the politics on the ground was consistent with the idealist ALP National Platforms. Furthermore, 
Garrett revealed that the later omission of the Precautionary Principle from environmental chapters 
was in response to the demands of the right-wing faction and the CFMEU. The National Platforms 
were generally perceived as a genuine democratic effort at climate change agenda setting.  
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6. How?  
Discussion 
This research study investigates the key political actors who influenced Labor Government climate 
policy to determine the barriers to real action against climate change for a progressive party in 
Australia. It aims to understand the insufficiencies of the ALP’s response to ‘the greatest moral 
challenge of our generation’ (Rudd 2007) by examining interest group influence. It finds the mining 
industry has manipulated the ALP’s ecological modernisation policymaking framework to suit its 
self-interest.  
The impact of interest groups is evident in the National Platforms and in the financial concessions 
granted to subsidise the effects of mitigation policy. The ALP was informed by the usual suspects. 
Scientists, economists, environmental and climate stakeholders, farmers, business, industry and 
governments were consulted during the policymaking process. Beyond democratic cooperation 
with key interest groups in the electorate, the ALP was also influenced by powerful vested interests 
that conflate their self-interest with that of the nation (Pearse, G. 2009; Swan 2012). Specifically, 
mining companies and emissions-intensive industries exerted enormous pressure to safeguard 
their short-term profits from the potential impacts of climate policy.  
As an interest arena, the mining industry consists of businesses, trade unions and associations. 
This carbon lobby, known internally as the Greenhouse Mafia, exercised disproportionate power 
through its lobbying effort to defeat the environmental movement ‘with religious zeal’ (Miller 2006). 
Its membership boasts the ACA, MCA, BCA and AIGN; all have been donors to both major political 
parties. Fossil-fuel industry associated trade unions such as the ACTU and CFMEU also drive 
donations and share personnel. Greg Combet and Martin Ferguson held leadership positions with 
the ACTU before their ministerial appointments with the ALP.  The flows of staff and money are 46
two means by which groups have traditionally aimed to influence political parties (Halpin and 
Fraussen 2018:382). A common ideology is a third means. 
 ALP MP Martin Ferguson was the Minister for Resources and Energy between 2007 and 2013. 46
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The mining industry also deployed insider and outsider politics as a contemporary alternative to 
institutionalised party-group relations to penetrate the increasingly professionalised Labor Party 
(Halpin 2015). It outwardly engaged in populist politics, staging advertising wars and disinformation 
campaigns based on sponsored, self-serving research. Behind closed doors, it resorted to threats. 
Alarmist predictions of mass industry shut-down, although unfounded, were a means by which 
international mining giants exerted disproportionate influence. Simultaneously, emissions-intensive 
sectors were quick to stoke the legitimate concern of job loss in regional areas with marginal ALP 
seats. Longstanding, institutionalised linkages between the mining industry and political parties 
alongside strategic scare-campaigns have entrenched the coal hegemony to ensure action on 
climate change is systemically inhibited (Baer 2016:194).  
Since its election to government in 2007, the ALP has maintained its narrative in support of action 
on climate change. Its campaign for the ‘climate election’ of 2007 was used to differentiate itself 
from the previous 11 years of Howard Government (Gascoigne 2009:523). The polarising nature of 
the climate change debate provided a welcome opportunity for the ‘climate-friendly’ ALP to capture 
an electorate increasingly concerned with the imminent threat of climate change (Macintosh et al. 
2010:200; Kassam 2019). Despite its commitment, ALP climate policy was predominantly 
constrained in the framework of ecological modernisation. Climate policy, framed by a narrative 
that the economy would benefit from a move toward environmentalism, was ultimately limited to 
growth-oriented, market-centric practices. The promise of ‘clean’ industries and ‘Green Collar’ jobs, 
while appearing to decouple growth from environmental degradation, fail to address dangerous 
corporate practices at the centre of climate change (Steggmann and Ossewaarde 2018:25,26). 
Green growth tropes such as CCS and sequestration function to reinforce existing power relations 
and the expansion of the fossil-fuel industry.  
Increases to operational efficiency in high-polluting sectors are a common means by which the ALP 
employs its weak EM approach to environmental problems. By reducing the number of resources 
required to turn a profit, and ultimately increasing corporate profit-margins by reducing input costs, 
high-polluting sectors are able to reduce their impact on the planet. This is in conflict with the 
 !58
systemic transformation required to decarbonise the fossil-fuel dependent Australian economy. 
Furthermore, the ALP avoids addressing the climate through means that are not standard practice. 
It does not expressly address climate change - it constructs policy around related ecological issues 
which come to serve as a proxy for this contested partisan problem. For example, the water-related 
clauses in the National Platforms avoid stating the link between climate change and severe 
drought. The resulting drought policy is concerned with the distribution of water resources rather 
than mitigating and adapting to climate change. Overall, Australian climate policy addresses the 
symptoms of climate change rather than the disease, thereby enabling the nation’s biggest 
polluters and their destructive corporate practices to persist with business-as-usual.  
The findings regarding mining industry influence and ALP ecological modernisation are prevalent in 
related studies on climate change in Australia. These findings corroborate evidence on the effect of 
mining industry pressure on political parties (Garnaut 2008; Macintosh et. al 2010; Pearse, G. 
2009; Taylor 2014) and the limitations of economic approaches to climate change (Bryant 2014; 
Curran 2009; Pearse, R. 2016 and 2018; Stegmann and Ossewaarde 2018). The mining industry 
was the key political actor to have influenced Labor Government climate policy. While the mining 
industry is not the only interest groups in the climate change policymaking arena, it has 
unprecedented power relative to its competitors. It has been able to exert undue influence by 
manipulating the ALP EM framework which privileges economic growth and the maintenance of the 
coal-hegemony. The ALP EM framework shelters the mining industry from the potential impacts of 
climate policy by mitigating its emissions-reduction responsibilities. Thereby, it safeguards 
emissions-intensive business-as-usual and, in extension, the Australian carbon-economy.  
The predominance of the EM discourse coalition is closely followed by the justice framework, 
encapsulating climate, environmental and intergenerational justice. This framing by the ALP is 
characteristic of its social democratic nature which stems from its origins in the workers’ movement 
(Economou 2012:13). While EM approaches are implemented by progressive and conservative 
parties alike, the use of justice frameworks in climate change policymaking is uniquely progressive. 
In contrast with the business-oriented neoclassical LNP, the ALP values the needs of the collective. 
Various collectives are represented by interest groups which interact with the ALP to ensure justice 
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vis-a-vis climate policy. Farmers, indigenous Australians, middle to low-income earners and 
environmentalists for coastal and bush heritage and biodiversity are accounted for within the ALP 
National Platforms. The operation of interest groups is key to democracy and ensures the 
sustainability and longevity of major structural reform.  
Alternative explanations to the insufficiency of Labor Government climate policy note the difficulty 
of policymaking in a polarised, partisan environment (Fielding et al. 2012; Rootes 2008; Tangney 
2018; Tranter 2011). While institutionalised checks and balances in the bicameral system did not 
favour the Labor Government, this does not explain the failure of progressive climate politics. The 
ALP failed to secure the balance of powers in both the Rudd and Gillard Governments hence 
received considerable resistance from the Senate. The Senate, dominated by LNP denialist views, 
blocked the CPRS in the first term. This was balanced by the Greens in the second term, who 
expressed dissatisfaction with the weakness of the Clean Energy Act, but ultimately pushed the 
policy through parliament (Cheung and Davies 2017:103). As policymaking is a daily occurrence in 
the Australian parliament, the lack of meaningful climate policy cannot be attributed to the 
Australian bicameral system. Rather, the conflicting objectives in the upper and lower houses are 
those of parties informed by obscured political actors whom this study aims to uncover. Therefore, 
the insufficiency of Labor Government climate policy can be attributed to the undue influence of 
interest groups, especially the mining industry.  
The qualitative portion of this research study suffered limitations of time and access to potential 
interview candidates. Most prospective respondents did not respond to the interview invitation and 
many declined. While the effects of incomplete knowledge and memory on interview responses 
was anticipated (Vogt et al. 2014:25), the small size of the sample amplified this limitation. A larger 
sample size would compensate for incomplete knowledge and memory as additional responses 
can be used to fill in the gaps. The career histories of the participating Members of Parliament 
provide only a contextual basis for their participation, however, the flow of personnel is often a 
means by which interest groups interact with political parties (Halpin and Fraussen 2018:382). 
Results pertaining to the effects of organisational cross-appointments may have emerged from a 
larger sample size of interviewees. The research study would also have benefited from a more 
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diverse pool of interview subjects, including political staffers and industry representatives. Data 
collected from a larger, diverse pool may have constructed a better overview of the state of climate 
change mitigation policymaking. This would also have allowed for more thorough triangulation. 
The influence of the mining industry on the Labor Government has exacerbated the insufficiency of 
Australia’s weak ecological modernisation approach to climate change. Climate change requires 
bipartisan action based on international scientific consensus. If Australia is to contribute effectively 
to global climate action, this undue influence must be neutralised. While interest groups are key to 
democracy and the contemporary political party system, the uneven distribution of power amongst 
interest groups has proven problematic. The mining industry outnumbers and outspends its fellow 
interest groups, reducing the space for its competitors to engage in democratic consultation with 
the government. It has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to translate its economic power into 
political power (Baer 2016:199). Climate justice can only be achieved if the undue influence of the 
mining sector is neutralised and the nation’s biggest polluters are held responsible for their 
contribution to carbon-emissions. Furthermore, mitigation requires both progressive and 
conservative political parties to address the problem rather than its symptoms. Real action rather 
than policy masquerading as adaptation measures is required by Australia.  Climate policy must 47
work to transition the carbon-intensive economy based on comprehensive political and economic 
system transformation. 
Concluding Remarks  
The mining industry is the most powerful interest group opposed to climate policy. Its significant 
sunken costs in emissions-intensive corporate practices and the opportunity cost of future profits 
place mining industry objectives in conflict with environmental preservation. The MCA, in particular, 
spread disinformation bolstered by industry-sponsored research studies with fixed conclusions. 
They conducted an advertising war to generate public dissent regarding the Labor leadership. 
Meanwhile, international mining giants resorted to threats. Both insider and outsider techniques, 
 An example of policy masquerading as adaptation is drought policy, discussed on page 59. 47
Drought policy aims to redistribute scarce water resources post-crisis rather than addressing 
climate change at the source of the problem. 
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characteristic of contemporary party-group relations, were employed to sway the government and 
its climate policy. Various traditional measures were also used in conjunction with this campaign, 
namely shared money, personnel and ideology. Party donations, board appointments and a shared 
ecological modernisation approach to environmental problems have facilitated a coal-state nexus. 
It has enabled the mining industry to have undue influence over Labor Government climate policy. 
This nexus inhibits Australia’s response to dangerous climate change (Baer 2016:194), resulting in 
policies such as market-based emissions-reduction schemes that fundamentally shift responsibility 
away from the nation’s biggest polluters (Pearse, R. 2016a:319).  
As the mining industry is central to both the carbon-economy and the climate crisis, the Australian 
Government is faced with a contentious predicament balancing the nation’s economic needs and 
its international environmental obligations. Although the mining industry exerted undue influence, 
the ALP endeavoured for justice in granting financial concessions. Carbon credits and subsidies 
served as a sustainable policy phase-in to counter the threat of mass industry closure and, 
simultaneously, to revive the ALP’s reputation following the mining industry’s advertising onslaught. 
The individual was also compensated through the threefold increase in the tax-free threshold, 
designed as a redistributive measure to benefit citizens. The ALP collaborated with all varieties of 
interest groups to achieve fair and equitable policy outcomes for all stakeholders in its constituency 
- as is its democratic responsibility. However, market-based emissions-reduction schemes such as 
those employed as climate change mitigation by the ALP ultimately perpetuate business-as-usual. 
Their greatest benefit is to the short-term profit of the carbon economy and at the expense of 
nascent eco-friendly alternatives such as the renewable energy sector.  
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Appendix  
A. Interview Questions  
1. What interest groups did you encounter or observe concerned with climate policy during your 
time with the Labor Government (2007-2013)? Which groups more persistent than others? 
How did they try to influence policy? Who or what was the most influential group or insider? 
2. Reflecting on Labor Government climate policy, what was the rationale for financial 
concessions, subsidies and carbon credits granted to the emissions-intensive industries? 
Reflect on the role of the carbon intensive industries in securing these concessions. Who were 
they designed to benefit? (Individuals, politicians, groups, etc.) 
3. How far did the the Labor Government’s commitment to a low-carbon future extend? What do 
you think this commitment was motivated by? (E.g. Ideology, re-election, the economy, etc.) 
Regarding the National Platforms: 
4. Article 7 in the 44th National Platform states that ALP environmental priorities are informed by 
the Precautionary Principle. This states that ‘if there is a high risk of serious or irreversible 
adverse impacts resulting from resource use, then use should only be permitted if those 
impacts can be mitigated or there are overwhelming grounds for proceeding in the national 
interest’. This principle was not included in any future ALP National Platform. Why, after 2007, 
was the Precautionary Principle abandoned? What was the thinking behind deleting this clause 
(if known) from future Platforms?  
5. The 45th and 46th National Platforms created during the Labor Government years stated a 
‘belief in the need to decouple economic growth from emissions growth, a priority that has 
particular resonance for developing countries’. Can you recall from your personal experience, 
possibly from having attended the National Conferences, what was meant by decoupling 
economic growth from emissions growth? How was the ALP hoping to achieve this? And how 
realistic or effective was this means to achieving decoupling? 
6. The 47th National Platform created post-Labor Government in 2014 has relatively ambiguous 
environmental priorities compared with previous platforms. It contains little reference to farmers 
and business or industry interests. Why was this? How do discussions about the environment 
differ at National Conferences when the ALP is in and out of government? Do interest group 
pressures also differ, and how? 
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For Wayne Swan:  
7. I read your essay in the Monthly about vested interests, in which you refer to the 0.01%. How 
does this apply to climate change policy in Australia? What effect do vested interests have on 
climate change mitigation policymaking? What about vested interests for and against mitigation 
policy?  
8. As Treasurer, did the nature of your interactions with interest groups change? Did your 
interactions increase in quantity or intensity?  
For Joel Fitzgibbon:  
9. Your electorate, Hunter, is a coal-mining region. Do you encounter some mining union groups? 
Which ones? What other interest groups speak for coal? How do these groups try to achieve 
their objectives?  
10. You’re part of the Centre Unity Faction. What kind of interest groups are involved with Centre 
Unity? I’m interested in your experience as part of the Centre Unity Faction with interest groups 
concerned with climate change mitigation policy. What is their stance on climate change? Is it 
hard to juggle their interests and toe the party line?  
For Greg Combet: 
11. You were a Union Official and the Secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions. Being in 
a leadership position in the peak body of unions, did you notice that some unions were more 
persistent than others? How do they try to achieve their objectives? 
12. As Minister for Climate Change, did the nature of your interactions with interest groups 
change? Did you interactions increase in quantity or intensity? 
For Peter Garrett:  
13. You were the President for the Australian Conservation Foundation; did this organisation try to 
influence government policy in any way? How? How effective was it? How responsive was the 
government? Does this differ with your experiences with interest groups whilst working in 
government?  
14. As Environment Minister, did the nature of your interactions with interest groups change? Did 
you interactions increase in quantity or intensity? 
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B. Interview Transcripts   
i. Interview with Wayne Swan  
Interview with Wayne Swan  
Phone Call on 11 July 2019 
Question 7 
Regarding - Vested Interests  
It’s the same effect with all structural reforms such as tax or climate change. You don’t get 
structural reform bigger than climate change which is a price on carbon across the whole economy. 
Now when you do that you challenge a whole lot of powerful and vested interests, in this case, you 
know there's all of the mining companies, the energy-intensive, all the heavy energy-intensive 
industries, and for that matter, even the finance sector which is self-professed to be much more 
sympathetic to the cause. But when push came to shove whenever any of the three big groups 
thought that a commitment to reduce carbon emissions conflicted with their short term profit, I’ll tell 
you, the short term profit imperative won every time. That’s the point I made. The big structural 
reforms cost more in the short term but have bigger benefits in the long term. So big business and 
big powerful vested interests are not prepared to put their shoulder to the wheel. They’ll squash 
that and that's what happened with carbon. For us to get a second emissions trading scheme 
through the house and actually implement it, we didn't do it with the open support of most of them, 
the business sector or some of the largest offensive companies and when the concerns started 
they started to play populist politics. They didn't stand up to them with the long term interests they 
went to short term interests rolled over and the consequence is we’ve had a decade of energy 
insecurity and soaring prices. So you know big structural reforms which challenge the power of 
vested interests are always hard. They're never achieved easily. In the case of carbon pricing, that 
is the classic exhibit A in the process that we’re talking about.  
Did vested interests penetrate the party?  
No, not really. There were some people who were sympathetic to some of their causes. I mean 
everyone wanted to keep industry going. By and large, the party was pretty united on the carbon 
price. We didn’t really have any great misery over it. There were people at the fringes but it had 
been a very strong part of everything we’d been doing. When you and I last discussed when it first 
went into the platform, which was a pretty long time ago. Even Howard pretended he was going to 
move towards it which was before 2007 but he never did.  
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Question 1  
Regarding - Interest Groups  
It would have been a bloody period of engagement with all of those people, they had been taking 
out newspaper advertisements against me, slagging me off across the board. Forrest, Rinehart. 
The whole lot of them. So after we got carbon pricing up… I had never actually met any of them. I 
knew Forrest, but I had never met Rinehart. So I had a talk. You know you've got a responsibility to 
the country and they are your investors. Whatever you think of the person and of the politics, you 
do your best to work with them. Even if they oppose you basically, you’ve got those responsibilities 
in government. I had never met her so that was the reason the meeting took place. It didn’t achieve 
particularly anything at all really.  
I met with all those vested interests. The whole time we were putting our carbon pricing scheme 
up. The first one, the second one, it was chocker-block, back to back meetings with powerful, big 
companies and so on. That’s what you do in government, you meet with those people. Just 
because you disagree with them that doesn’t mean you don’t talk to them. Chocker-block. I spent 
all my time as Treasurer going in and out of meetings with people who are big investors in the 
economy. That’s what you do.  
You’ve seen the techniques if you read the section on tax you’ll see the very substantial campaign 
they mounted behind the scenes. Obviously the discussions I had with… And I think many people 
in climate would have been engaged in the same underhand, behind the scenes expenditure of 
money, campaigns, against my party and myself. I am sure it happened on carbon like it happened 
on tax but you don’t always see it all and its not obvious.  
Basically, the Minerals Council was probably the most influential private vested interests which 
represented the largest mining companies. Basically the Minerals Council for most of that time was 
run by BHP behind the scenes. Who professed to be all in favour of doing something dramatic and 
significant in doing something about climate change until it came to actually affecting them.  
Question 2  
Regarding - Concessions  
Well, because you can’t close down the economy. [Laughs]. It’s ludicrous to think you can put in it 
a reform like that, so great, and close down large industries. You've got to carve out a practical 
program. I don’t think even anyone, even someone as barking mad on the left would suggest you 
should put in place policies which close down large slabs of your industry. You've got to work the 
policy through all those things which is what we were doing.  
How do you explain the inconsistencies between the Garnaut Review and the CPRS White Paper?  
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There certainly wouldn't have been more in some cases. I don’t dispute that for a minute. I don't 
think the gap was that large. But certainly, there would've been because we would have had to 
work through the practical implementation of the program. Not the theoretical presentation of one 
absolute, practical effect daily but in industry A, B, C, or D - wherever they're located. If you look at 
our CPRS in light of recent history, you know, some of those purists might have thought you should 
never give assistance to any industry, but the truth is if you want a policy to be sustainable over 
time it has to be practically implemented. Part of the problem with carbon pricing in Australia has 
been there’s been too many purists who wanted full implementation immediately, completely 
unconcerned about the immediate fall-out or impact on ordinary people and you know 
policymaking is not possible in the theoretical. If you want to maintain ongoing support for 
something like carbon pricing then you have got to be conscious of that.  
Question 4  
Regarding - Precautionary Principle  
It sounds barking mad and probably shouldn't have been there in the first place.  
Question 6  
Regarding - Interest Groups  
We talk to all the interest groups. It’s not just farmers, its not just miners. It’s also the finance sector 
and every sector of the economy is impacted by pricing carbon which is why its such a hot button 
issue. It moves into every aspect of economic and social life and I wouldn't be surprised if there 
was more stuff on farmers in there at one stage. There’s a whole lot of industry policy that hinges 
on carbon pricing, once of those industries would be carbon farming. The purist expression of 
industries relies on renewable energy. There’s all forms of carbon sequestration. There’s a whole 
lot of different industries reducing carbon or storing or mitigating it or whatever. The fact that one 
sector had a change at one stage or was more recognised here or there is nothing.  
ii. Interview with Joel Fitzgibbon  
Phone Call on 15 July 2019 
Question 1  
Regarding - Interest Groups  
This is going to be difficult as that’s 10 years ago. I’m not going to make it up on the run. I don’t 
really recall. I mean I would have been lobbied. I’m going to call them all the usual subjects. I mean 
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I would be misleading you if I said off the top of my head. Even if I had been given a chance to 
think about it I doubt I would remember. Look, I don’t I’m sorry. It’s so long ago. I would only be 
guessing and I don't think that’s helpful. I don’t really remember.  
Question 9  
Regarding - Member for Hunter 
Climate change remains a hotly contested public policy right across the country and in my own 
region. My view is the electorate is becoming more progressive over time, and more and more 
people, and a broader range of people, are coming to the conclusion that climate change is real 
and real action needs to be taken. I think that will continue to evolve over time. Even electorates 
like the hunter, electorates which are traditionally based on coal mining and coal-fired power 
generation are becoming more progressive, but at the same time, when people are pushed to 
make a commitment to supporting meaningful climate change policy, they're often guided by the 
economic costs on themselves and on the community and that issue is no easier here today than 
what it was ten years ago. Now after the election, for example, there was a big swing against Labor 
in the Hunter and that swing was in large part that Labor was anti-coal mining.  
Are you aware if there is a large presence of mining unions in your electorate?  
In the Hunter Valley, while climate change has been an issue for many many years. If you go back 
to the 2013 election, Labor again had a very large swing against it and that was largely because of 
the so-called carbon tax and the mining tax. In my region, whenever Labor is perceived to be in 
any way anti-coal mining or anti-coal fired power generation, it suffers a very substantial swing. In 
saying that, the level of activism in the Hunter Region isn't all that strong. In fact, I don’t recall my 
own electorate being subject to any large protests. There have been protests in the region, 
activists often strap themselves to the railway line which take the coals to port close to Newcastle. 
Over time there have been some protests, not in my electorate, but up in what is now the Lyne 
electorate up in Gloster for example, by groups like lock-the-gate, but I think that was largely about 
coal seam gas. But in my electorate, despite feeding most of the coal to the coal port in the world, I 
don't recall there being a protest. The school children participated in the students against climate 
change march in the lead up to the electorate but I wouldn't describe that as a protest. So that’s an 
interesting thing I hadn't thought about it much myself in the past, the fact that we are, I suppose 
the centre of coal mining activity, and yet I don’t recall any substantial protests taking place in my 
electorate.  
Why do you think that might be?  
Maybe the activists pick their mark and see my electorate as being so supportive of coal that they 
see that their efforts would be better invested somewhere else.  
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Question 10  
Regarding - Centre Unity Faction  
Yes, a fancy name for the right. The faction doesn't formally interact with any interest groups or 
activists. I think the most important point to be made there is that the right-wing of the party 
typically tries to achieve some balance in the climate change/economic development fund. While 
you should never generalise or stereotype, people in the left are more likely to be more bolshy in 
their activists on climate change than the people in the right. People in the right are looking to 
balance the need to act with the need to retain and grow jobs in the economy. No formal 
engagement but certainly I’d like to think that the right brings the balance which ensures that we 
don't overreach on climate change. In addition to having an economic impact, overreach typically 
consigns us to opposition for longer periods of time and if you're in opposition you can’t achieve 
any of your key objectives as a party.  
Question 2 
Regarding - Concessions 
Well I suppose what Labor was trying to do there was develop a policy which both has the desired 
impact of limiting carbon output while at the time doing too much damage to the economy and 
therefore too much damage to itself politically. The architecture the Gillard Government put in place 
was beautiful in its sophistication covering every possible consequence of that carbon policy. Too 
often its a carbon tax. There was compensation for pensioners, low-income earners, emissions-
intensive and trade-exposed industries, etcetera, the raising of the tax-free threshold which 
ensured compensation to everyone really. So the Labor government was trying to make sure it was 
not only addressing climate change and carbon output, it was also acting responsibly and making 
sure people weren't too adversely impacted by the policy and therefore hoping it could be sold to 
the Australian people, which we know now was not the case.  
Additional Comments  
I’ll make a point which might interest you. You’ve probably heard of a group called LEAN: Labor 
Environmental Action Network which was very active in this space over the course of the last three 
years. I don't know if they even existed in the 07-13 period. They may have done but most certainly 
I don’t remember them from them. Oh well. They were very, very active. They had quite an 
influence on the Labor policy over the last three years. They brought a whole range of 
environmental policies. Having said that I believe that Labor’s climate change policy leading up to 
the last election can be described as a light touch. In other words, not as robust as the carbon tax 
under Gillard or CPRS under Rudd.  
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iii. Interview with Peter Garrett  
Email Response on 12 August 2019  
Question 1  
Regarding - Interest Groups  
A review of media over this period will help inform this question. Industry groups: BCA, and AIMIC, 
in particular, were active, and the mining industry-funded campaigns against the government 
undoubtedly affected the political debate. ACF and other ENGOs were present too but generally 
outnumbered and outspent by industry. 
Question 2  
Regarding - Concessions  
Greg Combet’s book and Lenore Taylor’s articles in the FinReview will provide a deeper 
perspective on this matter.  
Question 3  
Regarding - Just Transition  
Governments don’t really have ‘vested interests’, they have an interest in implementing policy (for 
example, see the Gillard government’s legislative program), staying in power and advancing the 
national interest. 
Question 4 
Regarding - Precautionary Principle  
I was always in favour of that principle, notwithstanding what the Platform stated at the time or any 
changes that occurred, and included it in my decision making when Minister, especially in relation 
to EPBC approvals (see the Guardian/my website on that issue). Changes like this to the platform 
generally reflected the view of the right faction, and some powerful unions like the CFMEU who 
were reluctant to advance true sustainability. It didn't prevent a minister form acting in favour of the 
environment if he or she so chose. 
The remaining questions were answered ‘see above’.  
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iv. Interview with Greg Combet  
Phone Call on 5 August 2019 
Question 1  
Regarding - Interest Groups  
Every interest group known to humankind I think would be the broad answer. So interest groups in 
business, governments at other levels and certainly obviously environment groups but everything 
conceivable, especially business groups and in different industries. Especially businesses and their 
representatives who were in the business in emissions-intensive, high polluting industries. The coal 
industry, you could say, was very persistent. But yeah obviously the more that, if you look at sort of 
the business world, the more that business impacted by efforts to reduce greenhouse gas and 
things, the more that they are persistent.  
There were a lot of public statements made but most of it tends to go on behind the scenes. For 
example, the coal industry peak body commissions research that duly showed what they wanted 
with alarmist projections about the loss of jobs in coal mining, closures of coal mines, the impact on 
regional areas. They always pointed out that many of these seats were in marginal seats, there 
was an implied political threat. That sort of stuff is pretty common and happened across many 
areas. In environment groups, of course, its completely the other side of the argument. But they're 
also well organised and are also not averse to pointing out the risks in marginal seats so you know 
that people know that politicians are sensitive to how people vote in a democracy and they use that 
and commission research for their own purposes.  
Question 2 
Regarding - Concessions  
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions especially in a very emissions-intensive economy like 
Australia’s is a massive change. Its a massive economic change. We have a lot of emissions-
intensive industries, not just in the electricity generating sector but in steelmaking, cement 
manufacturing, aluminium smelting, the plastic sector, liquified natural gas, exports, coal mining 
more generally, the list goes on and on and on. So if you're looking as I was doing to introduce a 
price signal that would encourage businesses to reduce their emissions, they focused very heavily 
on that and as a minister you have to properly analyse the impact of the policies you're bringing in 
at a macroeconomic level, an industry level, regional level and a company-specific level and on 
jobs, employment of working people in Australia. In doing all of that, I reached the view and the 
government reached the view that we needed to phase in the price signal in areas like steelmaking 
and aluminium smelting and a whole host of others, because to introduce it without any phasing in 
would in our view have lead to the loss of jobs and the closure of some businesses with an impact 
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in regional areas. So in the emissions-intensive part of the economy we’re talking about, that was 
the reason why. It was a phase-in of the carbon price arrangements.  
Question 11 
Regarding - Unions 
They knew me well so obviously I had a dialogue with many of the unions. So obviously the unions 
representing people in coal and steel and aluminium making industries like that I had a lot of 
dialogue with. But you know, I probably would have had even more with businesses involved, 
company leaderships. But you know, with my background I was very concerned to ensure that the 
workers employed in these areas were not adversely impacted and that there would be a transition 
in the economy and that it would take some time. Just to give you one specific example of what 
that means, I’m a coal mining engineer myself originally. That’s how I found my way into the union 
movement, I was a coal miner. I worked underground, I know the industry and the people and the 
union and many of the companies as well. And its obviously at the centre of climate policy, the coal 
sector. So I put a lot of time to understanding the impact of a price signal on the coal industry and 
impact on people and in order to overcome the scare campaign I spent a lot of time going to coal 
mines, to coal mining union meetings, addressing people to explain the policy and the coal mine 
union ultimately decided to have a plebiscite, to give everyone a vote, a secret ballot amongst their 
members, as to whether of not they support the carbon pricing policy and over 90% supported it in 
a secret ballot. So we attended to their conners and put appropriate arrangements in place to 
transition people. Its generally referred to as just transition. You cannot change the economy 
overnight. It has to be done over a fair period of time.  
Question 3  
Regarding - Just Transition  
We were absolutely commitment. We wouldn't have put ourselves through all this pain, I can 
assure you. We were totally committed to bringing in an emissions reductions policy that would 
achieve targeted emissions reductions over time and would allow for a socially just transition of the 
economy. That was our approach and that was what we did. I might say that we did successfully 
legislate it when we were in a minority in both houses of parliament and it was in place for two 
years and it was working. The emissions were coming down for those two years and the brown 
coal, the heavily polluting part of the electricity sector, lost some market share but no businesses 
closed. It was working until Mr Abbott repealed it.  
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Question 4 
Regarding - Precautionary Principle  
It would have been replaced by a policy that was probably reflective of what we were doing in 
government, I suspect, and the party conference is only every three years I think and I don’t 
remember the chronology of it. But there’s also a practical reality for political parties. When you're 
doing those national policy platforms the debate and the outcome tends to be dominated [by 
idealism]. You know, its a genuinely democratic process. There’s a bit more idealism in it. But when 
you're in government, you're constrained by many other factors. The number one being economic 
reality. On the precautionary principle you could argue that with coal mining, it may be better it be 
shut down, phased out sooner rather than later, and certainly not approve of any more coal mines. 
But that is more a Greens type of approach, Greens party type of approach. But when you're in 
government and you're responsible for the economy, you're responsible for billions of peoples 
livelihoods, their families, their kids getting to school, you know all the rest of it and you have to 
think about these things in a longer term context and bring about change over time and ensure that 
people are protected in the process in a reasonable way. And that then tends to mitigate against 
some of the more visionary and idealistic elements of party platform making.  
Question 6 
Regarding - Interest Groups 
Once you're in government, you have got a wider set of responsibilities to be mindful of, but also, 
the influence of interest groups. By the time you're in government, the interest groups have been 
expressing their interest groups most forcefully to you as a government. Take agriculture, we 
excluded agriculture from our carbon pricing scheme and one of the reasons for that it’s such a 
difficult area scientifically, technically, politically, like dealing with emissions from agricultural 
livestock is a really complex problem. And in the last decade or so the science related to that has 
actually improved a lot but we didn't have that available to us then. Similarly, the sequestering of 
carbon in soil was an uncertain carbon endeavour but thats advanced a lot. You know we didn't 
have the policy tools available to us necessarily to deal with agricultural emissions at the time. 
Take motor vehicles for example as well. We excluded domestic vehicles as well from our carbon 
pricing scheme as well although they're a large contributor to our greenhouse gas emissions. 
That’s essentially because it’s so politically difficult to put extra charges on petrol when people 
don’t have an alternative that to use a car and petrol as electric vehicles were not even in their 
infancy 10 or 12 years ago. So things like that come into play and ultimately are reflected in the 
party platform. That some more pragmatic things come into play when you're in government and 
have to take responsibility.  
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Additional Comments  
You're on the right track. Interest groups are very powerful and influential. From all walks of life 
whether they be unions or business groups or environment groups or churches. But that’s as it 
should be in a democracy. Ware a democracy. Provided those institutions are properly reflecting 
the interests of their community or the cohort of people that they represent. That’s not a bad thing 
in a democracy. That leads to better public policy outcomes. Ones that are more sustainable. Also 
helps government mitigate the risk of doing harm so I don't have any real complaint as a former 
minister in this policy area. What I didn't like though was when threats were issues. That’s 
overstepping the mark. That happened often in the mining industry in particular. They are large 
international mining companies and Australia is just a little place in the southern hemisphere in the 
minds of some of those executives and they don't like it if the government down here interferes in 
the success of their business. So we had some interesting conversations with international mining 
executives. They behaved like, in few instances, like the tobacco sector. Brutal in trying to prevent 
any impact on their own commercial interests. They don’t muck about. These things are played 
very hard. Basically the shutting down and putting people out of work. And so as a government 
you've got to think is that real or is it just a threat? Pretty much it was just a threat. Australia has 
some industries, but resources are a different thing. They’re in the ground here. Something like 
aluminium smelting, for example, that’s an industry that is global, the commodity is traded globally. 
You can shut down an aluminium smelter if you have enough resources and open one up 
somewhere else. So in those circumstances you have to consider very carefully as a government 
and some times the threats are very nicely put with a smile. Very subtle. But the point is very clear. 
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